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As existing U.S. infrastructure ages, government entities are looking to the private 
sector and to alternative financing mechanisms, such as project finance, to help 
leverage traditional funding sources and pay for the increasing needs. As a result, the 
use of Public-Private Partnership (P3) delivery method in the U.S. has increased over 
the last two decades. The question is how the existing cases can be used to potentially 
enhance the current P3 model both in terms of bankability and overall procurement 
process maturity.   
 
This study is organized into three main parts. In the first section, project finance in 
general and the role of different credit enhancements in structured project finance in 
  
particular have been. In the second section, a QCA analysis has been perfumed to 
study and compare 18 P3 projects that have been procured in the U.S. over the last 
two decades. The goal is to identify logical patterns between project characteristics 
(i.e. capital value, term of contract, construction risk, traffic and revenue risk, and 
procurement competition level) and financial characteristics (i.e. equity IRR, interest 
rate on debt and leverage). The results are further analyzed to refine conclusions that 
to can provide a better understanding of how financing package of P3 projects may 
change based on project characteristics and policy objectives. In the third section, an 
enhanced P3 model has been proposed by using crowdfunding. A SWOT analysis has 
been conducted to explain how the proposed approach can improve current P3 model.  
 
The findings of this study can help P3 practitioners to better utilize available tools and 
also provides them with new tools to further enhance procurement of P3 projects.  
The case library provides a significant resource to practitioners as well as researchers 
and the proposed corwdfunding approach is a novel step toward taking P3 projects to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Existing infrastructure facilities in the United States have aged over the last decades, 
and the need for new improvements has emerged in order to maintain the economic 
competitiveness of the country and address the growing needs; however, the funding 
availability for infrastructure projects has not increased at the same rate as the 
growing needs for creating fiscal constraints. The use of deficit financing through 
municipalities has delayed dealing with the problem, and this mechanism cannot be 
used further since debt limits have been reached and the overall rating of the 
governments are at risk. As a result, a shift away from traditional funding and 
municipal financing to project financing, particularly for development of new 
facilities, is taking place. This fundamental shift for large infrastructure projects 
explains an expanding use of project financing via P3 delivery models.  
Large infrastructure projects are expensive, and in most cases cannot be financed 
solely by user fees. User fees can be used to determine how much the private sector 
can invest in a project in terms of debt and equity; however, if project cost is larger 
than debt capacity and equity capacity, government assistance can be used with a 
structured project finance approach to make projects bankable. This assistance can be 
either in terms of subsidies or credit enhancements. Due to fiscal constraints, 
providing subsidies to projects might still be challenging; however, structured finance 
techniques can be used to minimize the level of subsidy needed to bridge the 




What factors influence debt capacity and equity capacity and how can better 
financing be structured to improve overall financing of a project? To structure a better 
financing package, one should know what tools are available and how they can 
improve the debt capacity and the equity capacity. This study attempts to take a step 
toward better understanding of the role of structured project finance and different 
types of assistance in public-private partnership (P3) projects. The motivation and 
approach of this study is discussed in detail in this opening chapter. To understand the 
current state of knowledge and practice, available literatures have been reviewed and 
the implications in P3 projects have been discussed to provide a better understanding 
for decision-makers and practitioners. This study also provides a review of 18 P3 
projects in the United States to identify logical patterns between project 
characteristics and risk profiles, and characteristics of financing packages in terms of 
debt, equity and leverage. This dissertation provides an enhanced P3 model using 
principles of crowdfunding that can be used to enhance project delivery, both in terms 
of financing and policy considerations, for P3 projects.  
Funding Challenges in the U.S. 
 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 caused a severe credit crunch, in which the 
general availability and supply of private finance severely decreased. The 
downgrading of the “monoline industry (which guaranteed bond repayment if an 
issuer defaulted)” coupled with the capital constraint made banks the only viable 
source for infrastructure projects and raised concerns about the quality of bank assets 
(Connoly & Wall, 2013). New banking regulations were enacted, which resulted in a 




investors changed their perspective on risk-return trade-off, becoming more risk 
adverse (Burger, 2009). The reduction in availability of private finance and investor 
risk appetite due to the crisis greatly affected the investment profile of long-term 
illiquid investments, especially within the infrastructure sector. 
The impacts caused by the Global Financial Crisis on infrastructure investments are 
further magnified by government budget constraints due to reductions in tax revenue 
and increases in competition for funds (Beniad, Lavee, & Solomon, 2011). 
Traditionally, U.S. transportation infrastructure projects have been procured at the 
state or local level as design-bid-builds and received substantial capital funding from 
either the federal government through the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) or state issued 
bonds (EnoTrans, 2014). The HTF has been supported by numerous acts since 1991, 
of which the most current act passed in 2012 is the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 
21st Century Act (MAP-21). While MAP-21 and other prior acts are a vital funding 
source for transportation projects, they have also experienced funding shortages and 
required general fund infusions. The HTF is currently facing this problem with a 
funding shortage projection over the coming months. Moreover, state and local 
government borrowing in the form of state issued bonds has decreased because of the 
availability of debt capacity and restrictions on debt finance (Small, 2010).  
As existing U.S. infrastructure ages, the need to address improving this aging 
infrastructure, meeting growing capacity demands, and maintaining economic 
competiveness emerges. This need combined with capital and U.S. government 




which government entities are struggling to find new funding and financing 
approaches. 
The Shift to Innovative Financing Approaches 
 
States and local entities are looking to the private sector and to alternative financing 
mechanisms, such as project finance, to help stretch their infrastructure dollars as 
traditional funding sources diminish (EnoTrans, 2014). Partnering with the private 
sector via project finance enables the government to reduce its share of financing in 
the project and thus reduce its expenditure (Beniad, Lavee, & Solomon, 2011). 
Furthermore, the state and local entities can utilize project finance to transfer debt off 
their balance sheet and also deliver needed infrastructure projects to the public. 
A trend towards project finance is evident in MAP-21. Over the period of October 1, 
2012 to September 30, 2014, MAP-21 provides federal funding for surface 
transportation of greater than $105 billion, of which $1.75 billion is exclusively set 
aside for the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) 
program (FHWA, 2012). The TIFIA program provides credit assistance for qualified 
projects of regional and national significance and, historically, each dollar of funding 
has allowed TIFIA to provide approximately $10 in credit assistance. Thus, TIFIA 
can leverage $1.75 billion in funding to provide approximately $17 billion of low 
interest rate loans to transportation projects (USDOT, 2012). For eligible 
transportation projects, credit assistance from the TIFIA program usually covers up to 
33% of the total project cost. Therefore, the $1.75 billion specific for the TIFIA 
program can potentially help finance approximately $52 billion worth of 




available for transportation projects and the $52 billion worth of project cost that can 
be leveraged through TIFIA, the importance of project finance at a federal level is 
clear.  
In addition to TIFIA credit assistance, “the federal tax exemption of interest payments 
on state and local bonds is clearly an important cost saving, often highlighted in 
comparisons of public and private options” (Small, 2010). Private activity bonds 
(PABs) are tax-exempt bonds issued by a state or local government, in which the 
proceeds are used for a qualifying purpose by a private user (IRS).1 In 2006, the 
Internal Revenue Code was amended to add highway and freight transfer facilities as 
a purpose for which PABs can be issued. This change in regulation reflects a federal 
desire to increase private sector investment in U.S. transportation infrastructure and 
supports the trend towards project finance (FHWA). Furthermore, new discussions on 
creating state infrastructure banks and lifting the limitations on tolling interstate 
systems reflects a change in federal policy to help states deliver infrastructure projects 
using project finance rather than federal funding. The shift away from traditional 
funding and towards project finance puts states in the driving seat in developing 
transportation projects and shows the importance of addressing transportation 
investment needs over the coming years. 
 
 
1 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) explains that qualified PABs that are issued by a state or local 
government may be considered as tax-exempt bonds, if 95% or more of the net bond proceeds are used 
for one of the several qualified purposes described in sections 142 through 145, and 1394 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (Internal Revenue Service). 
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Project Finance in P3 Projects 
 
Project finance in the general form, as limited recourse financing of stand-alone 
projects, has been used for centuries (Kensinger & Martin, 1988). The modern 
version of project finance, as a loan financing technique used in large-scale high-risk 
projects based on contractual allocation of project risks and rewards, has received 
special attention since the 1970s (Kleimeier & Megginson, 2000). Private finance 
gained more momentum in the 1990s (Shaoul, Stafford, & Stapleton, 2006) and is 
currently starting to again gain momentum. Public and private partners are coming 
together to utilize private finance via project finance structures, especially public-
private partnerships (P3s). The Congressional Budget Office (2012) defines P3s as “a 
variety of alternative arrangements for highway projects that transfer more of the risk 
associated with and control of the project to the private sector.” Since P3s can take 
different forms, disagreements about the exact definition of a P3 delivery method 
exist. For the purpose of this study, a P3 is defined as a long-term contractual 
arrangement between public and private partners to develop a transportation asset by, 
at a minimum, bundling capital financing with design, construction, and possibly 
operations and maintenance.  
The shift from public funding and municipal finance to project finance at a state level 
has been implemented in large transportation projects, particularly through the P3 
model. As of June 2014, thirty-three U.S. states and one U.S. territory enacted 
statutes that enable the use of various P3 approaches for the development of 
transportation infrastructure (FHWA). While P3s have become more widely utilized, 




infrastructure crisis. “Ultimately, solutions to the infrastructure crisis require dollars 
that necessarily will need to come from user fees, tax revenues, or other dedicated 
funding sources” (EnoTrans, 2014). Project finance structures in the form of P3s are 
one tool to use and can help mobilize the upfront investment resources needed to get 
projects started. 
Basic Principles of Project Finance 
 
Project finance structures differ from sector to sector and from project to project; 
however, the basic principles of off-balance sheet and leverage underlying these 
structures are common (Yescombe, 2013). Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
in the context of ‘Basel II’ defined project finance as “a method of funding in which 
the lender looks preliminary to the revenues generated by a single project, both as the 
source of repayment and as a security for the exposure.” This definition explains the 
off-balance sheet nature of project finance, which allows isolation of project risk in a 
separate stand-alone entity where the sponsoring firms may receive limited collateral 
risks. Since public entities “need to pay attention to their amount of debt, because it 
affects their credit rating and creates obligations for future taxpayers,” the off-balance 
sheet principle is important when it comes to state debt capacity (Small, 2010). 
The other basic principle in project finance is leverage. The project finance 
framework is usually based on debt financing, particularly in large infrastructure 
projects (Esty, 2004). The financing cost can be minimized by maximizing the 
amount of the cheapest source of financing, which is usually debt. In most P3 




a toll concession P3 project is highly dependent on the expected toll revenue, which 
determines how much lenders are willing to lend to the project and how much equity 
investors may invest in a project. Answering these questions results in the debt-to-
equity or leverage ratio. While a highly leveraged structure maximizes the cheapest 
form of financing, it also increases the probability of bankruptcy (Small, 2010). 
Therefore, the goal is to optimize leverage in the financial model by maximizing 
finance for the project based on the constraints and security features, protecting 
lenders and equity investors from default. If debt and equity are insufficient to pay for 
project costs, then a financing gap exists, which may be bridged by optimization of 
leverage ratios through credit enhancement structures. 
Debt Capacity 
 
Due to non-recourse nature of project financing, the amount of debt the project 
developer can issue under a project finance approach is limited. This limit is usually 
determined through a systematic analysis known as the Debt Financing Test. In this 
process, cost of revenue generation, such as the operation and maintenance (O&M) 
expense, is subtracted from the rated revenue2 (RREV) to determine the debt free 
cash flow, which is the yearly cash available to pay off debt. In order to account for 
uncertainty in forecasts, the debt free cash flow is divided by a safety factor, the Debt 
Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR). Finally, an average interest rate (i) will be used as a 
discount factor to find the net present value of the project’s debt free cash flow over 




                                                 
 
the concession period (j). The output of this is the amount of debt a private company 
can leverage for the project.   
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  ∑ [((𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑗=1 − 𝑂&𝑀)/𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅 )/(1 + 𝑖)𝑗]                        (1) 
Looking at equation (1), the rated revenue and estimated O&M expenses are 
variables linked to project characteristics and have no direct correlation to the 
financial elements. The DSCR and interest rate are financial variables, which are 
calculated based on the project risk profile. The DSCR is a safety factor directly 
related to the uncertainty associated with revenue forecasts and determines the level 
of leverage in a project. As discussed previously, leverage can make a project 
cheaper, but can also contribute to the probability of default and ultimately to the 
project risk profile. The interest rate is comprised of risk-free and the risk premium 
components. The risk free component is a function of market conditions, including 
expected inflation, and is not linked to project characteristics. A risk premium is 
added to the risk free component to account for investment risks directly associated 
with a project, such as construction cost, operating costs, traffic levels and future 
regulations (Small, 2010). This portion of the interest rate can vary from project to 
project - the higher the project risk profile, the higher the risk premium and “the 
higher return needed to attract investors to markets for private capital” (Small, 2010). 
Assuming other variables remain constant, a lower DSCR results in a higher amount 








The same debt capacity concept applies to equity capacity. Lenders and project 
sponsors usually enforce a minimum equity investment in P3 projects in order to 
minimize opportunistic behavior of the concessionaire (Cui, Farajian, & Sharma, 
2010). In the Equity Financing Test, payments to equity holders are assumed to fall 
below debt service payments in the waterfall of project accounts. This means the risk 
profile and internal rate of return (IRR) for equity investors is higher than the risk 
profile and IRR of debt holders. Concessionaires are assumed to take a more 
optimistic view of the revenue line compared to the forecasted revenue for debt. The 
revenue line for equity investors can be called total revenue3 (TREV). Free equity 
cash flow is the yearly cash available to pay dividends to equity investors and 
calculated by subtracting O&M, debt service (DS) payments and taxes from TREV. 
This free equity cash flow should be discounted back to the year of analysis by using 
an appropriate Minimum Acceptable Rate of Return for the private sector (MARR). 
The output of this test is the amount that the private company will most likely be 
willing to invest in the project as equity.  
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = ∑ [((𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑗=1 − 𝑂&𝑀 − 𝐷𝑆 − 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖)/(1 + 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅)𝑗]   (2)      
In equation (2), the only financial variable is the MARR which is directly 
linked to the risk of investment for equity holders. Assuming other variables remain 
constant, the higher the investment risk for equity holders, results in a higher MARR 
required and lowers the equity capacity. If some of this risk can be mitigated through 
3 Total revenue (TREC) is the forecasted revenue determined from the base case traffic model. 
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financial and contractual mechanisms, then the MARR will decrease and the amount 
of equity capacity will increase. 
The Financing Gap 
 
The sum of equity capacity and debt capacity represents the total financial capacity of 
the project and “hence the cost to the public purse of private finance and the price 
paid for risk transfer—the risk premium” (Shaoul, Stafford, & Stapleton, 2006). If the 
financial capacity can cover all project expenses, the project will be “financially 
viable” and there will be no need for public funds. Otherwise, the project will have a 
financing gap, as shown in equation (3), and will be “financially un-viable.” 
              𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐺𝑎𝑝 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 +  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦)          (3)                       
A financing gap means the project is missing an overwhelming demand profile. This 
gap can be bridged but “will require a significant level of public involvement and, 
perhaps, public investment, to reach investment-grade levels” (Forsgren & 
Macdonald, 2005).  
Research Need and Pursuit 
 
The discussion in the previous sections provides the foundation for the main question 
of this study:  How can the bankability of large infrastructure projects procured as 
P3s be enhanced using innovative financing mechanisms and approaches in today’s 
economy? 
As discussed earlier, a review of the basic principles and equations of project finance 




equity capacity is insufficient to cover project costs and must be bridged to make 
projects bankable.   
In chapter two, two bridging mechanisms are addressed, including public subsidies 
and the growing role of structured project finance approaches in the form of credit 
enhancements. Literature on structured project finance has been reviewed as a part of 
this study and the lack of availability of literature addressing this topic, particularly 
by academic researchers, is identified. Structured project finance credit enhancements 
are categorized as: financial guarantees, contractual guarantees and subordinate debt.  
In chapter three, different research methodologies that can be used in this study are 
discussed and the selection of a hybrid research methodology based on Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and limited statistical analysis is discussed and 
justified. A step-by-step discussion on identification of outcomes, cases, conditions 
and variables for the QCA analysis is provided followed by a special discussion on 
translation of the meanings into variables that develop the raw data. 
In chapter four, the data collection on the cases is discussed and internal validity 
tastings are performed to check the consistency of the data table. The data table is 
analyzed based on the principles of the QCA and the results are discussed. Some 
sensitivity tests are conducted in this chapter to help interpret the results.  
In chapter five, some additional statistical analysis is performed to better refine the 
results from the QCA analysis. This chapter has a detailed discussion on the results 




In chapter six, a special discussion is provided to discuss application of the results in 
policy and practice. A new framework has been developed in this chapter as an option 
that can enhance feasibility and desirability of delivering infrastructure projects using 
a P3 delivery method.  
Chapter seven, the conclusion chapter, summarizes the findings and the contributions, 
































Chapter 2: Available Strategies for Bridging the Financing Gap 
 
The elements of debt capacity, equity capacity and project cost are the key factors in 
financial viability of P3 projects.  A financial close cannot be achieved on a P3 
project unless financing gap is bridged and the sources and a balance is created 
between sources and uses of funds. This gap can be bridged by public subsidies, 
enhancing debt capacity and/or enhancing equity capacity. This chapter offers a 
summary of strategies that can be utilized to enhance financial viability of P3 
projects. 
Bridging the Financing Gap with Public Subsidies 
 
In practice, using public subsidies to bridge the financial gap has traditionally 
received the most attention. Many states in the U.S. have enabling legislation 
permitting local, state and federal funds to be combined with private sector funds on 
P3 projects. As illustrated in Table 1, most of the P3 deals in the U.S. have been 
financed with some sort of direct financial contribution from the state in the form of a 
subsidy. The World Bank defines subsidies as “direct fiscal contributions or grants 
paid by the government to a project when revenues from user fees are insufficient to 
cover all capital and operating costs while still providing private investors with a 
reasonable rate of return” and argues that “without subsidies, some infrastructure 
projects that would provide economic or social gains, but are not financially viable, 






Table 1: Financial Structure of recent P3 projects in the US (Public Works Financing, 2014) 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) categorizes three types government subsidies 
used in the financing of P3 projects: one time, transitional and ongoing subsidies 
(Asian Development Bank , 2008). ADB considers grants as one time subsidies 
usually paid during the construction phase to cover the gap between financing raised 
based on the projected user fees and the actual costs of the project. Transitional 
subsidies are normally paid during a transition period, or ramp-up period, to ease the 
transition to full capacity operation. Ongoing subsidies are annual payments paid 
based on availability of services or level of traffic and are usually “linked to a 




or explicit cross-subsidies” (Asian Development Bank , 2008).  Figure 1 shows 
different types of public subsidy. 
 




In this study, a grant is considered a subsidy which is usually made to the project 
during the design and construction phases. A grant demonstrates the commitment of 
the public entity and bridges the financing gap. Since it does not provide a sustainable 
source of revenue for the project, however, it usually cannot be used in the financial 
model to leverage resources through debt financing. The U.S. Route 460 Corridor 
Improvements Project is one of the more recent examples, in which the 
Commonwealth of Virginia is providing an approximate $1,153 million grant. This 
grant bridges the financing gap between a total project cost of $1,466 million and the 


















Lien Revenue Bonds: Series 2012: Official Statement, 2012). Public subsidies can 
also be in the form of milestone payments, which are grants paid to the developer 
based upon project progress normally tied to completion of a certain portion of 
construction. A recent example of using a milestone payment on a P3 deal is Presidio 
Parkway. For this project, the developer will receive approximately $185 million 
from Caltrans upon substantial completion of the project (presidioparkway.org). A 
grant can also be made available to the project in the form of contributions for certain 
activities, including Right-of-Way (RoW) contributions, wetland or stream credit 
contributions, and funding assistance in utility work.  
Transitional and Ongoing Subsidies 
 
The subsidy concept has been extensively studied in the economic literature, 
particularly by Gerald Faulhaber (1975) in regards to public utility. A subsidy 
contribution can be in the form of transitional or ongoing payments, such as providing 
availability payments,4 low interest rate loans or tax-exempt bonds. Due to the recent 
changes in the financial markets, more states have started using tolled or non-tolled 
availability payment models. In this model, a series of payments are made to the 
developer based on performance during the operation of the facility. The payments 
are usually supported through general public funds, annual maintenance funds and/or 
toll revenue if there are any user fees. Availability payments are usually treated as 
project revenues and can be used in private financing to include private equity and 
4 Availability payment can be considered both as credit enhancement or subsidy. In the context of a toll 
road in which the revenue risk stays with the sponsor, availability payment is a credit enhancement due 
to its ability to reduce revenue risk for investors. In the context of a non-toll road in which availability 
payment is a performance based payment paid from future funds available to the sponsor, availability 
payment can be considered as a subsidy due to the fact that the road is being provided to the users at no 
user fee.  
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debt.  On a tolled facility the public agency takes the underlying revenue risk 
associated with the availability payments; therefore, the project can usually receive 
better interest rates, DSCR and potentially attract more equity at a lower expected 
IRR. This enhanced financial structure may result in a lower initial contribution of 
public funds compared to a tolled concession project, in which the concessionaire 
takes the underlying revenue risk. A recent deal to close in the U.S. using an 
availability payment model is the East End Crossing (East End Crossings). 
Other types of government subsidy have been used in the U.S. P3 projects. For 
instance, TIFIA loans can be categorized as subsidies.5 The TIFIA program utilizes 
federal funds to provide low interest rate loans to qualifying transportation projects. A 
recent TIFIA loan agreement for the SR 91 Corridor Improvement Project in 
Southern California provides a $421 million loan at a rate similar to the rate for AAA 
bonds as opposed its actual rating of BBB- rating (Federal Highway Administration, 
2013). The other financing mechanism that is subsidized by the U.S. federal 
government is tax-exempt bonds that can be used in P3 deals, such as tax-exempt 
PABs. Since the interest earned on these bonds is not subject to federal tax, investors 
are likely willing to accept a lower return on their investment, resulting in a lower 
interest rate and financing cost for the project (Federal HIghway Administration).  
The amount of academic literature in which the formation of an optimal P3 financial 
structure are analyzed and discussed is gradually growing (see eg. Lopez-Lambas and 
5 TIFIA can also be considered as a Credit Enhancement since it provides flexible financing terms, 




                                                 
 
Monzon, 2010; Moszoro, 2010; Zhang, 2005a,b; Dewatripont and Legros, 2005; 
Reeves, 2005; Sharma and Cui, 2010; Jasiukevičius, 2012). An underlying 
assumption in most of this literature is an unlimited availability of public funds. As 
discussed earlier, however, recent funding challenges in practice have limited the 
ability of government agencies to invest additional funds into projects without facing 
short-term and long-term fiscal consequences. After the limited funds are utilized 
through public subsidies, the key question becomes how to bridge the remaining gap 
by increasing debt and equity capacity and thereby enhancing the project risk profile 
for investors and making the project financially feasible. 
Bridging the Financing Gap through Structured Finance 
 
A structured project finance approach can increase debt capacity, as well as equity 
capacity, by using complex legal and financial models to rearrange the risk profile in 
economic assets. This technique increases the overall financial capacity of the assets. 
The basis of structured finance is on the prioritization of economic assets (e.g. loans 
and bonds) and issuance of a prioritized capital structure of claims against these 
collateral pools (Coval, Jurek, & Stafford, 2009). Although project finance might be 
considered as a division under structured finance, the influence area of structured 
project finance goes beyond the credit limits of the project itself and may include the 
credit of different parties involved in the project. The possible impacts and 
consequences of using a structured project finance approach on all involved parties 




States are starting to utilize structured project finance techniques in the form of credit 
enhancements to both bridge financing gaps and reduce public subsidies. Credit 
enhancements facilitate access to long-term financing with better terms on the debt 
and open the project up to new categories of debt and equity investment by enhancing 
the overall investment risk profile for investors. They are provided through 
contractual provisions or financial guarantees and thus are less tangible and more 
difficult to be analyzed than public subsidies. This type of assistance has special 
importance in P3 agreements due to the unique characteristics of P3 projects – high 
uncertainty embedded in a long-term contract with multiple stakeholders (Athias, 
2007). Risk allocations, payment mechanisms, flexibility and renegotiation, contract 
duration, refinancing, non competing facilities, protections against changes in law and 
contract termination are examples of commercial terms used in P3 contracts, which 
determine the risk profile of P3 projects (Iossa, Spagnolo, & Vellez, 2007).  
In a report published by the European P3 Expertise Center (EPEC), different 
European credit enhancement mechanisms available in for P3 projects are categorized 
as: financial guarantees, contract provisions and sub-sovereign creditworthiness 
guarantees (SCG) (European PPP Expertise Center, 2011). Scott L. Hoffman (2008) 
provides additional sub-categories for credit enhancements in his book “The law and 
business of international project finance.” We use a similar approach in this study to 
categorize different types of credit enhancements. Financial guarantees include loan 
guarantees and refinancing guarantees. Contractual provisions include risk sharing 
mechanisms, including: revenue or usage guarantees, guaranteed minimum service 




against future competing developments, termination payments, debt assumption 
undertakings and residual value payments. We consider contractual guarantees a form 
of sub-sovereign creditworthiness guarantees, in which payment obligations by the 
sponsor are pledged to the project to enhance the risk profile for investors. Figure 2 
illustrates a high-level breakdown of different types of credit enhancements. 



















Variable Contract Term 
Minimum Revenue 
No Competeting Facility 
Clause 







The lack of resources, knowledge and experience by investors to understand P3 
project risk and the lack of appetite by some investors to accept complex risks 
associated with P3 projects limits the market penetration for P3 financing (Delmon, 
2011). Financial guarantees can help to solve these problems by limiting the level of 
risk investors may face. In addition, the provider of the financial guarantees goes 
through extensive analysis to identify and quantify the risks associated with the P3 
project. This provides an additional layer of confidence for investors to ensure the 
government entity familiar with the P3 project has diligently analyzed all the risks 
associated with the project and will have responsibilities should any issues occur.  
Financial guarantees are given in two forms: loan or contract payment guarantees. 
Loan guarantees are usually designed to increase the liquidity of the financial 
structure and ensure prompt payment of debt service. Loan guarantees can be 
provided to the project in the form of a line of credit (LOC). For instance, in the 
financing of U.S. Route 460 Corridor Improvements project in Virginia, a revolving 
$80 million LOC has been provided by the Virginia Transportation Investment Bank 
(VTIB). The sole purpose of this LOC is to decrease the probability of default on debt 
service payment. Loan guarantees can also be provided by development banks or 
even insurance companies. For instance, BANOBRAS, the development bank of the 
Mexican Federal Government, provides a guarantee known as a “Timely Payment 
Guarantee,” which is an unconditional irrevocable package that guarantees timely 
payment of principal and interest payment. The other guarantee package that 
BANOBRAS provides is a “Contract Payment Enhancement Guarantee,” which 




type of guarantee may be valuable in countries with a high risk of default by the 
government and may not be applicable to U.S. P3 projects.  
Financial guarantees can help to increase credit worthiness of projects and enhance 
the credit rating, resulting in savings on interest rates. The savings will depend on the 
size of guarantee and the amount of coverage. Government entities can subsidize the 
price of a guarantee by using other tools, such as TIFIA guarantees. Without any 
subsidy, the guarantor is protecting the downside and may charge a price tag for the 
guarantee because they require a more significant share of the upside. Available 
literature on sizing and pricing of guarantees reveals the importance of this topic 
particularly in the complex financial structures used in P3s (see eg. Irwin, 2007; 
Mody & Patro, 1995; Jones & Mason, 1980; Haastrecht, Plat & Pelsser,  2010). Lack 
of literature on the quantitative analysis of the sizing and valuation impacts of 
financial guarantees or contractual; however, makes in depth analysis on this topic in 
the context of P3 projects challenging.  
Contractual Guarantees 
 
A report published by the World Bank Institute finds that contractual guarantees 
provided by the government agency through P3 agreements may be more effective 
than guarantees provided to enhance the bankability of P3 projects (The World Bank 
Institute, 2012). The concept that project risks can be transferred to the private sector 
is sometimes misunderstood. The main value in P3s is created through optimal 
allocation of risks to the parties that can best manage these risks. Contractual 




In a review of comprehensive agreements for multiple P3 projects in the U.S., we 
have identified main clauses that provide contractual guarantees to investors.  For 
instance, non-compete clauses can provide a higher certainty in terms of forecasting 
the traffic demand over the term of the comprehensive agreement. The provisions 
related to changes in law, such as tax laws, will provide more clarity to the 
concessionaire on the amount of taxes that it should pay, and will reduce the risk of 
future tax increases. In the U.S., both clauses have created very controversial 
discussions. Some have criticized the state agencies of eliminating the option to make 
future improvements to adjacent roads as a result of non competing facility clauses, 
and some have raised doubts on constitutional issues associated with providing a 
protection against changes in law, as it may be interpreted as interfering with the law 
setting authority that only elected bodies may exercise. This study does not intend to 
explore these issues further as it is beyond the scope of this study; however, authors 
wish to emphasize the knowledge gap for future research projects. 
Another example of contractual obligations is risk sharing in terms of environmental 
impacts, unknown underground conditions or RoW impacts. For instance, in U.S. 
Route 460 Corridor Improvements Project, the total risk that the developer faces in 
terms of wetland mitigations or RoW acquisition cost has been caped through 
contractual provisions. This provides a higher certainty regarding potential cost 
creeps as a result of these risks and thus a lower DSCR has been used in the project 
without impacting the credit rating of debt, which determines the interest rate used. 
The other example of contractual guarantees is minimum revenue guarantees, which 




Kokkaew & Chiara , 2013). A minimum revenue guarantee acts similar to other 
contractual guarantees by reducing the level of uncertainty for investors. Therefore, 
the guarantees contribute to a reduction in the required level of DSCR and, as a result, 
increase debt capacity. Different contractual guarantees may create contingent 
liability that stays with the government entity. A financial obligation for a contingent 
liability is only triggered when the dependent event occurs; otherwise, the 
government entity has no financial obligation. For instance, a minimum revenue 
guarantee may not trigger a financial obligation unless the revenue falls below the 
guaranteed revenue. In this case, the government entity will have to make a payment 
to honor its minimum revenue guarantee. The literature on minimum revenue 
guarantee impacts on the credit rating of government entities and on the rating and 
accounting impacts of materialization of the contingent liability associated with these 
guarantees is limited. Moreover, additional insight on how government entities should 
treat contingent liabilities in terms of accounting and debt affordability is very 
limited. The closest accounting standard that can be used to evaluate such 
contingencies is GASB 60.6 As new mechanisms emerge in structured project 
finance, the need to update the accounting standards becomes more tangible.  
A good alternative to a minimum revenue guarantee could be a variable contract term, 
in which the term of contract is extended if a certain IRR on equity is not achieved. 
This concept was first introduced by Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic (2001) and has 
been used in a few projects in Chile; however, it is a new concept in the U.S. and has 
6 The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is the source of generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) in the United States. GASB Statements 60, Accounting and Financial 
Reporting for Service Concession Arrangements, (GASB 60) addresses public-private partnerships as 
service concession arrangements. 
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yet to be utilized. The rationale behind the term extension structure is to provide, if 
needed, a “tail” in the financing to bring additional equity to the structure. Assuring a 
minimum IRR on equity using the term extension will likely decrease the expected 
IRR for equity investors; however, it is difficult to predict the extent to which the 
market may react to this idea. The amount of benefit that would be ascribed to the 
term extension mechanism will vary dependent upon the goals and objectives of the 
equity investor, as well as the level of the minimum IRR on equity established by the 
government entity. A variable contract term does not require a cash payment 
obligation; therefore, from an accounting perspective, it may be viewed as a deferral 
of future revenues instead of a cash obligation and does not introduce the same debt 
affordability challenges that a cash obligation may create. Although a variable 
contract term may be appealing to equity investors, it does not provide the same 
confidence that a minimum revenue guarantee provides in terms of the timing of debt 
service payments. Thus, it may not increase the debt capacity of the project. If the 
objective is to minimize upfront subsidy on a revenue risk project, a minimum 
revenue guarantee may generate better results in terms of accounting and debt 
affordability analysis. Future research in this area may provide additional insight on 
the benefits and challenges of this approach in the context of structured project 
finance, particularly implications of this approach in terms of accounting and credit 
impact both to the project and to the guarantor.  
Subordinate Debt 
 
Subordinate debt is another source of credit enhancement that can be provided by 




flexible terms as compared to bank loans or bonds. By having a truly subordinate 
position to bank debt, TIFIA provides an additional layer of protection to senior 
lenders and helps to achieve a higher DSCR. This protection provides more flexible 
terms particularly in terms of debt service payment during construction and ramp-up 
period, which are particularly important in early years during when cash flows are 
very constrained. Providing subordinate debt without conducting necessary analysis, 
however, may result in over leveraged projects, which puts projects at a higher risk of 
default. After facing issues with loans provided to South Bay Expressway in 
California and Pocahontas Parkway in Virginia, the TIFIA program seems to have 
begun taking a more conservative approach to lending. This more conservative 
approach decreases the opportunity to make TIFIA loans fully subordinate. Thus, the 
benefits subordinate TIFIA loans provide beyond the subsidized interest rate will be 




The above discussion outlines the two options that are available to make a financially 
unviable P3 project feasible, adding more public subsidy or leveraging available 
funds by using credit enhancements in structured finance. The discussion in this 
chapter suggests that project characteristics such as the risk profile and financial 
elements such as interest rate on debt and equity IRR are the key factors in deterring 
the overall financing capacity of the project in the form of debt capacity and equity 




relationship between those elements to investigate how current P3 model may be 




























Chapter 3: Research Methodology and Framework 
 
The previous chapter provided a summary of state of practice and knowledge on P3 
projects. A P3 delivery method is usually used when there is a high level of 
complexity in the project so the private sector can provide value though innovations 
and efficiencies. These projects are usually large scale and expensive, and require a 
significant transaction cost and time (Farajian, 2010). In addition, except for a few 
states such as Virginia and Texas, most of the states that have the enabling legislation 
for using P3s, have passed their legislation in the past few years. As a result, only a 
few P3 projects have reached financial close in the United States, and only a handful 
of projects have reached substantial completion and are operational.  In addition, in 
many cases, the financial information of P3 projects is considered proprietary or it is 
considered very difficult to have access to this information even though it may be 
public information. As a result, the main challenge of this study is having a limited 
number of cases, and limited information available on each case. Therefore, a sound 
research methodology should be selected that enables a systematic analysis of the 
limited cases in order to reach logical conclusions. 
Selection of Research Method 
 
Conducting empirical analysis requires a “Medium-N” or a “Large-N” sample size 
(Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 1995). Due to this fact, it is very difficult to conduct an 
empirical study in the P3 field. Therefore, most of the scholars have decided not to use 




Due to the number of deals that have reached financial close in the past two years, 
this study is able to conduct some level of statistical analysis, although this can only 
happen after a qualitative analysis is performed to understand the logical 
relationships between different elements of the project and minimize the number of 
hypotheses needed to reach some preliminary conclusions. Therefore, the main 
focus of this chapter is on exploring non-empirical methods that can potentially be 
used as a research methodology to conduct an in-debt analysis of available cases in 
order to integrate qualitative and quantitative concepts of the cases and reach some 
preliminary conclusions to reduce the number of variables and provide the opportunity to 
start a high-level statistical analysis. Figure 3 shows some of the scientific research 
options that are available to researchers.  
 
Figure 3: Available Research Methods  
 
Due to the complexity and uniqueness of P3 projects, an in-debt analysis to 























characteristics at the time of project procurement, and the internal or external 
constraints is required to better understand how the deals were structured. This is 
why many researchers have used a case-based research approach to study P3 
projects. A case-oriented approach enables researchers to develop a deep 
understanding of that project, limitations and policy objectives, the deal structure, 
the risk-sharing mechanism and potentially the negotiation process and how the 
agreement was achieved for a particular project. However, it is hard to demonstrate 
how this method can provide a scientific comparison across different projects and 
make a generalization of the findings. The cons of the case-based research 
approach have mentioned this limitation: “it is very difficult to engage in any form 
of generalization, as the key findings and conclusions are mostly limited to that 
single case” (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). 
The question becomes how the complex P3 projects can be compared using a 
scientific method to study logical patterns. This chapter aims to focus on this 
question and intends to explore the literature to find the best approach that can be 




As discussed before, most of the literature in the P3 field in the United States is that 
“A ‘case-study’ is an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize 
across a larger set of units” (Gerring, What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good 




way of defining cases, not a way of analyzing cases or a way of modeling causal 
relations.” Gerring (2004) argued that most of the debate over the usefulness of the 
case-oriented approach has little to do with the method itself, but “more to do with 
the state of current research in the field.” On the other hand, some scholars have 
argued that a case-oriented approach is distinguished from other approaches 
because of its ability to do in-debt analysis on a single case and extend the findings 
to reasonable generalizations on a population (Aha, 1992) (Kennedy, 1979). It is 
important to realize that a case-oriented approach shows strengths and weaknesses 
like any other research method.  
Case-oriented research has received special attention in recent years (Gerring, 
2007), especially in the P3 research field (e.g., (Federal Highway Administration, 
2007; European Commission, 2004; Asian Development Bank, 2011). However, 
since every project is a unique project and has its own challenges and special-risk 
profile, it is very hard to use a case-oriented approach in the P3 field to make 
generalizations. This research requires a method more powerful than a case-
oriented research in terms of making generalizations. On the other hand, since the 
number of P3 projects in the United States is minimal, there is a need for a method 
that can effectively work with a Small-N. 
It is not easy to reach a conclusion or make a statement without comparing 
available information and data: “Thinking without comparison is unthinkable” 
(Swanson, 1971). “Comparison lies at the heart of human reasoning” (Rihoux & 




based on reliable data, one needs to understand how scientific ways can be used 
while comparing available data in different complex cases. 
Most of the literature in case-oriented approach is centered on topics such as 
qualitative data analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Eisenhardt attempted to provide a 
framework for theory building from cases. “one strength of theory building from 
cases is its likelihood of generating novel theory” (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, she 
admits that “some characteristics that lead to strengths in theory building from case 
studies also lead to weaknesses” particularly in the presence of imperial data 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, a case-based approach might be a good research 
methodology in some cases, where as in some other cases, this method might not 
be able to provide a powerful cross-unit analysis for generalization and theory 
building.   
Cross Case-oriented Research 
 
In order to understand a research method better, it is important to look at that 
method both in the historical context and its unique application in science and 
problem solving compared to other methods. “Comparison, as a basic and powerful 
operation, can be translated into a set of systematic comparative methods and 
techniques” (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
provides cross-case comparison while at the same time gives enough attention to 





The QCA was developed by Charles Ragin in late 1980s. The foundation of this 
method is based on Boolean Algorithms, which was originally developed in 1950s by 
electrical engineers to simplify switching circuits (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). This 
method has been widely used for applications in historical sociology and political 
science, but recently other fields of science such as engineering have started using the 
QCA method (Gross, 2010). The QCA method aims to marry the advantages of 
quantitative methods with case-oriented approaches: 
“In short, the ideal synthetic strategy should integrate the best features of the case-
oriented approach with the best features of the variable-oriented approach.” (Ragin, 
1987). The QCA method transforms the complex cases into Configurations in order to 
link specific combinations of some conditions into a given outcome. By doing so, the 
QCA enables the researcher to do a cross-case analysis in order to check his 
hypothesis and make generalizations (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). 
The QCA approach has borrowed the arguments from, in particular, J. S. Mills 
(1970), where he explained the two methods of comparison: 
– Method of agreement: 
“If two or more instances of the phenomenon under 
investigation have only one circumstance in common, the 
circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause 
(or effect) of the given phenomenon” 
 
– Method of difference: 
“If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation 
occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every 
circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in 




instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable 
part of the cause, of the phenomenon” 
 
The QCA method has evolved over time and has branched out into three different 
methods: 
– Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) 
– Multi-Value QCA (mvQCA) 
– Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)  
The different methods of QCA provide different advantages to the researcher. As 
illustrated in Figure 4, the csQCA works well with small sample sizes when there is 
not a huge need of preserving richness of the data set. On the other hand, the fsQCA 
works well with more numbers of cases where the need to preserve richness of the 
data set is high. The mvQCA lies somewhere in the middle of the other two 





Figure 4: Comparison of QCA methods (Source: Hartman & Cronqvist, 2009) 
 
In general, QCA techniques have the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, and are good candidates for the research methodology for this 
dissertation. 
The QCA approach enables the researcher to capture the complexity while being 
able to do a cross-case comparison. The QCA method also helps the researcher to 
generalize or replicate the results and findings. The QCA techniques are analytical 
transparent and replicable and have the power to produce modest generalization. 
 
Hybrid Approach for This Study 
 
The P3 projects are a combination of the policy considerations and 
financial/commercial implications that make it very challenging to marry those two. 
As explained before, conducting research on P3 related topics is very challenging 




States. For instance, some of the information that researchers need, particularly 
financial information, is considered proprietary and is not publicly available. 
Therefore, the restriction on having access to the information limits the availability 
of data and makes the design of the research very complicated. 
This study uses a hybrid approach with a combination of different approaches. In 
the first step, QCA will be used to study a medium sample-size of cases to find 
logical patterns and draw meaningful conclusions in order to minimize the number 
of hypotheses. The various techniques of QCA precisely identify and narrow down 
“conditions of occurrence.” In the next step, a more detailed analysis will be done 
using statistical techniques to further analyze findings. Figure 5 provides a 
summary of the application of the hybrid research methodology used in this study 









Application of Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
In summary, the QCA technique is used to identify different conditions that may 
result in different outcomes. These conditions are studied and quantified in different 




occurrences of specific outcomes. Through this systematic approach, the research 
question and the hypothesis will be evaluated and certain conclusions that can be 
made to generalize the findings. This study will use a hybrid approach to take one 
additional step to further analyze conclusions and refine the findings. 
Figure 6 demonstrates a sample QCA Configuration Table and shows what elements 
are involved in a QCA analysis. 
Figure 6: Sample QCA Configuration Table 
 
The different steps of the QCA method have been explained in detail by Rihoux & 
Ragin (2009) in their book titled Configurationally Comparative Methods. This 




Identification of Outcomes of Interest 
 
The first step in the QCA approach is identification of outcomes of interest. This step 
is particularly important because it is directly related to the research question and 
hypothesis. As discussed earlier, this study intends to investigate how financial 
structure of P3 projects may be improved to enhance bankability of P3 projects and 
reduce the need for public subsidy.  
As discussed in chapter two of this dissertation, the financing capacity of P3 projects 
is usually determined by debt capacity and equity capacity. Therefore, usually the 
main objective in structuring the financial package of P3 deals is maximizing the debt 
capacity and the equity capacity in order to maximize financing capacity of P3 
projects. Equation (1) and equation (2) in the introduction chapter of this study 
explain the main elements that influence debt capacity and equity capacity. It is 
beneficial to look at those elements once again: 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  �[((𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1
− 𝑂&𝑀)/𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅 )/(1 + 𝑖)𝑗] 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = �[((𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1
− 𝑂&𝑀 − 𝐷𝑆 − 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖)/(1 + 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅)𝑗] 
The main objective of this study is to analyze how debt capacity and equity capacity 
can be improved so the financing capacity of the project can be maximized. The 
following variables play a role in the above equations: 




– Total Anticipated Revenue (TREV) 
– Operation and Maintenance Expenses (O&M) 
– Taxes (TAX) 
– Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) 
– Interest Rate on Debt (i) 
– Expected Rate of Return on Equity (MARR) 
The revenue forecasts and O&M expenses are usually a function of project 
characteristics. Taxes are usually determined by accounting treatments and are 
subject to legal matters. However, DSCR, expected equity IRR and interest rate on 
debt are all determined based on the risk premiums and market characteristics and can 
have a great direct influence on debt capacity and equity capacity. Therefore, the 
following goals are specified as the objects of structuring project finance for P3 
projects and the preferred outcomes of the QCA analysis: 
– Minimize Interest Rate on Debt (i) 
– Minimize Expected Rate of Return on Equity (MARR)  
– Maximize Financing Capacity (maximizing financing leverage by maximizing 
use of cheaper source of financing, debt, instead of more expensive equity) 
The first two objectives are simple to explain. However, the third objective, 
maximizing leverage, is slightly more complicated. This objective intends to 
maximize the use of a cheaper source of financing, debt, compared to more expensive 
source, equity. To do so, the DSCR should be minimized so the maximum amount of 
debt can be issued and the financing leverage (debt/equity) can be maximized and the 
weighted average cost of capital can be minimized. As a result, the overall financing 




Selection of cases 
 
Selection of cases in QCA analysis is one of the important steps. The greater the 
number of conditions and possible the values are, the larger the data space is, which 
results in a higher accuracy of the results based on the comparison of cases.  
If multiple cases are available, identification of cases should be based on the “most 
similar” versus the “most different” system designs as shown in the Figure 7. All 
cases should share enough background characteristics and an adequate number of 
cases with different outcomes, both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ outcomes, should be 
included.  
 
Figure 7: Most Different Vs Most Similar Case Identification (Source: Rihoux and Ragin, 2009) 
 
The total number of P3 projects that have been successfully procured in the United 
States over the last 10 years is less than 20 projects. This study has identified the 




– Chicago Skyway   (financial close: Jan-2005) 
– Indiana Toll Road  (financial close: Jun-2006) 
– Pocahontas Parkway  (financial close: Jun-2006) 
– Capital Beltway  (financial close: Dec-2007) 
– SH 130 Segments. 5&6 (financial close: Mar-2008) 
– I-595 (FL)   (financial close: Mar-2009) 
– Port of Miami Tunnel   (financial close: Oct-2009) 
– North Tarrant Express  (financial close: Dec-2009) 
– I-635 (LBJ Freeway)  (financial close: Jun-2010) 
– Midtown Tunnel (VA) (financial close: Apr-2012) 
– Presidio Parkway (CA) (financial close: Jun-2012) 
– I-95 HOT Lanes (VA)  (financial close: Jul-2012) 
– East End Crossings (Ohio) (financial close: Mar-2013) 
– NTE Segments 3A & 3B (financial close: Sep-2013) 
– Goethals Bridge  (financial close: Nov-2013) 
– US-36    (financial close: Feb-2014) 
– I-69 Section 5    (financial close: Jul-2014) 
– I-4 Managed Lanes  (financial close: Sep-2014) 
The literature review on QCA did not result in a definite answer on the number of 
cases that will be required for a QCA analysis; however, Ragin and Rihoux (2004) 
suggested that an “intermediate-N” sample size should range within 5-40.  The 18 
cases selected for this study put the number of cases of the study within the specified 
range. 
Selection of Conditions 
 
As discussed earlier, conditions represent characteristics of each case. They are the 
variables that distinguish cases and, in the case of this study, characteristics that 




selected, since a large number of conditions may result in having too many variables 
requiring more cases to cover potential outcomes, and a small number of conditions 
may result in having contradictory outcomes, since projects cannot be properly 
distinguished based on their characteristics. Based on this approach, five conditions 
are being considered in this study. The conditions considered in this study are: 
– Project Size 
– Project Duration 
– Construction Risk  
– Revenue Risk  
– Level of Competition During Procurement 
 
Initial project cost provides an indication of overall size of project and often is the 
factor that is considered by contractors, lenders and equity investors when selecting 
the appropriate size of projects based on their resources and capacity. Duration of 
project is usually indicated by terms of the comprehensive agreement, which is 
another determining factor since it is an indication of the probabilities for refinancing 
or long-term investment. Construction risk provides the technical risk profile for the 
project and revenue risk determines the risk profile for observation of future 
revenues. The final constraint is the level of procurement, which indicates whether 
there was a chance to achieve the best value through receiving competitive prices. 
Matching Cases, Conditions and Outcomes to develop the Truth Table 
 
As discussed earlier, the QCA method translates different variables into meaningful 
values so a systematic comparison can be made. The following table represents how 




Conditions Variable Name Meaning Value 
Project Size Cost Low (1 billion or less) 




Project Duration Term Short (less than 50 years) 
Long (50 years or more) 
0 
1 
Construction Risk  CR-Risk None (brown-field lease) 
Medium ( regular construction) 





Revenue Risk  
TR-Risk None (availability payments) 
Medium ( toll road with history) 







Comp None (One Bidder) 
Low (Two Bidders) 

































Table 2: QCA Variables (Conditions, Outcomes) and Values 
 
 
       Constructing and Reviewing Raw Data Tables  
 
The next step after selecting outcomes, cases, conditions, variables and values is 




form of a matrix for future analysis and refinement. A sample raw data table was 
previously shown in Figure 6. 
One issue that may arise in this step is conflicting information. For instance, two 
cases may have identical values for conditions, but different outcomes. In that case, 
further investigation and potential adjustments will be required to understand why the 
outcomes are different. This may lead to introduction of new conditions that may lead 
the researchers to find out why outcomes are different.  This may also require a trial-
and-error process, which may result in developing a new scale for assigning values in 
order to develop a contradiction-free table that can be used in the next step for 
analysis. 
Analysis, Interpretation and Refinement 
 
The next step in the process is to analyze the table to minimize the table and look 
logical configurations between conditions that will result in certain outcomes. This 
analysis is done based on Boolean algebra algorithm as shown below: 
Where 
– An upper case letter represents the [1] value or existence of a binary variable 
– A lower case letter represents the [0] value or absence of a binary variable 
– Logical “AND” is represented by [*] 
– Logical “OR” is represented by [+] 
 
If   :                 A * B * Y + A * B * y → 0  
 
Therefore:                 A * B  →  0    
 




This analysis can be performed manually or with available software such as 
TOSMANA (Tool for Small-N Analysis). 
The minimization procedure is usually applied twice: first, for the [1] configurations, 
and then, for the [0] configurations. As discussed earlier, in most cases, the number of 
cases is not sufficient to represent all possible logical configuration of conditions, and 
therefore, the software may use some “Logical Remainders” as non-observed cases to 
the table to simplify assumptions and generalize findings.  
In this study, the analysis has been performed both with and without logical 
remainders to develop information for different purposes. Therefore, four complete 
minimization procedures have been run for each one of the three outcomes: 
– [1] configurations, without logical remainders 
– [1] configurations, with logical remainders 
– [0] configurations, without logical remainders 




At the end of the QCA process, certain generalized patterns will be discovered that 
will help to refine the hypothesis. Those patterns will be further analyzed to 
understand why different outcomes were achieved in different projects and discover 
potential options that can be utilized to enhance debt capacity, equity capacity and, in 
general, overall financial capacity of the project to achieve maximum leverage at the 
lowest weighted average cost of capital. As a result of this detailed analysis and 




practitioners to structure P3 financing packages more efficiently. This application has 
been discussed in more detail in chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
Special Discussion on Development of Meanings to Assign Values 
 
As discussed earlier, the QCA analysis in this study includes five conditions and three 
outcomes. This section provides a summary on how values have been assigned to 




Project size can be one of the indications of the overall size of the financing package 
and potentially it can impact the availability of market demand for debt or equity. 
Although in many cases large infrastructures have been successfully financed, the 
size of debt and equity in large infrastructure projects may impact the overall demand 
for the private investment in the project. For instance, some concessionaires are able 
to invest equity up to a certain level. If the size of required equity investment is more 
than their capacity, they may not be able to bid on the project or they may need to 
find other partners or one or more investment funds to help them come up with the 
required level of equity. The same issue may happen in the debt market: providing a 
bank loan to a large infrastructure project may require different banks to team up with 
each other to be able to lend the required amount of loan collectively. The bond 
market may experience the same issue, particularly if a large amount of bonds is 
being offered in the bond market even though the bond market may be more flexible 




For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that there is a relationship between the 
size of initial capital investment in the project and the size of financing. Therefore, 
projects with a capital value of $1 billion or more are considered relatively small and 
have been assigned a 0 value, compared to the projects with a capital value of more 
than $1 billion that are being assigned a 1 value in the data table. 
Project Duration 
 
Project duration is another important element that may influence financing package of 
P3 projects.  In most cases, toll concession roads in the United States have a term that 
is equal to or more than 50 years and availability payment projects have a duration 
that is 50 years or less.  
Two of the main reasons that toll concessions in the United States have terms of 50 
years or more are: (i) flexibility to mitigate revenue risk for debt & equity due to a 
period of time post scheduled debt full repayment (i.e., beyond 30-35 years), and (ii) 
tax ownership of the asset.  
Tax ownership allows a developer to depreciate certain expenses related to the wear 
and tear of an asset and, as a result, receive tax savings. The determination as to 
whether a developer can take depreciation on an asset is based mainly on whether the 
developer bears the risk of the exhaustion of the associated capital investment.  
A key consideration in this regard is whether the useful life of the asset extends 





If the term of a lease covers all (or perhaps even substantially all) of the useful life of 
the leased asset, then the developer would typically be considered the owner of such 
property for tax purposes. There are couple different ways to determine the useful life 
of an asset that consists of many interdependent assets, but it is a very asset- and 
developer-specific exercise as information on both assets (e.g., walls, foundations, 
interchanges, lighting, tolling systems) and materials used will be considered.  
The in-debt discussion of tax treatment of P3 projects is beyond the scope of this 
study; however, this study has categorized project terms into a short-term (less than 
50 years) with an assigned value of 0, and a long-term (50 years or more) with an 
assigned value of 1. There is only one project with a term of 50 years (US 36). Since 
this term is closer to the next higher term (52 years) than the closest lower tern (40 
years), it is assumed that 50 years belongs to the long-term category. 
Construction Risk 
 
In most P3 projects, construction risk is transferred to the concessionaire except in a 
few brown-field deals with no construction. This risk usually is usually transferred to 
the Design-Build contractor through the Design Build Agreement. However, it can 
still impact the risk profile for equity investors and lenders due to the liquidity issues 
that it may create in case a claim arises. Therefore, the more construction risk, the 





This study has categorized the cases into three different categories. Category one has 
no or very limited construction risk which is mainly brownfield projects with a value 
of 0. Category two has projects with the medium construction risk, which includes 
regular projects with standard construction risk with an assigned value of 1. The third 
category has projects with complicated construction elements and special risk profiles 
such as tunnels or complicated construction in developed urban areas. Category three 
projects have been assigned a value of 2 in this study. 
Revenue Risk 
 
Since the returns on debt and equity investments are paid by project revenues, there 
should be a direct relationship between the risk profile of project revenues and the 
risk profile of the debt and equity investment in the project, which results in the 
premium that should be expected by investors.  
There are three main types of risk profiles that can be defined for the cases that have 
been considered under this study. Some have almost no revenue risk (except 
appropriation risk) such as availability payment deals. They have received a value of 
0. Some have a risk profile similar to a mature toll road with a reasonable history of 
traffic and revenue. Those deals have some level of revenue risk; however, the 
uncertainty is minimal due to existence of historic data. Those deals have received a 
value of 1. On the other hand, some deals such as managed lane projects have a 
significant uncertainty in their revenue forecast due to lack of information in terms of 
behavioral responses of users to tolling in managed lanes. The recent issues with the 




revenue in some of those projects explain the high uncertainty and traffic risk for 
those projects. Those projects have been assigned a value of 2 in this study.  
Level of Competition 
 
One of the hypotheses of this study is that the level of competition plays a great role 
in achieving the best value, including an enhanced financing package, through a 
competitive procurement process. There are three levels of competition defined in this 
study. Level 1 with a value of 0 represents no competition, which means a one-on-one 
negotiation and an interim agreement was used to develop commercial terms and 
financing package. Level 2 means low competition existed between only two bidders. 
This level has been assigned a value of 1. Level 3 represents high competition 










Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Results 
 
The previous chapter laid down the research methodology and framework for this 
study. This chapter intends to conduct the analysis to investigate relationships 
between project characteristics and the financial package delivered for the 18 cases 
that have been selected to form the database of this analysis.  
The cases have been limited to P3 projects that at a minimum require development 
and delivery of a financing package with private sector investment in the form of 
equity. Therefore Design-Build projects or Design-Build-Operate-Maintain projects 
have not been included in the pool of cases. 
A software, TOSMANA 1.3.2, has been used to conduct the data analysis.  
Data Collection and Conditioning 
 
Table 3 summarizes the main project characteristics, financial package and 
procurement history of the cases selected for analysis in this study. Most of the 
information in this table has been gathered from project websites and financing 
documents. However, some information particularly related to expected equity IRR 
comes from reliable sources who are familiar with projects. Although due to 
proprietary nature of this information it may not be accurate up to decimal points, the 
accuracy level of the reported equity IRR in Table 3 is sufficient for the purpose of 








































 $600 m $2.1 bn $1.3 bn $1.83 bn 
Term 99 Years 75 Years 99 Years 80 Years 50 Years 35 Years 
Construction 
























































































































































































Close Oct-09 Dec-09 Jun-10 Apr-12 Jun-12 Jul-12 
Capital 
Value $1.1 bn $2.0 bn $2.615 m $2.10bn $473.00m $940.00m 
Concessio
n Length 35 Years 52 Years 52 Years 58 years 30 years 76 years 
Constructi








































































































































































 East End Crossing 
NTE 

























Close Mar-13 Sep-13 Nov-13 Feb-14 Jul-14 Sep-14 
Capital 
Value $763.00m $1.65bn $1.30bn $140.00m $290 m $2.30 bn 
Concession 
Length 35 years 52 years 40 years 50 years 37 years 40 years 
Constructio


































































































































































The next step in the QCA analysis is development of the raw data table from the case 
studies. In order to do so, the information in Table 2 regarding meanings of 
assignment of values to variables and the detailed case study information presented in 
Appendix 1 have been used to transform Table 3 into a raw data table. Table 4 









Risk Traffic Risk Competition 
Chicago Skyway $1,830 99 None Mature, Real Toll, Long Op. History 3 
Indiana Toll Road $3,800 75 None Mature, Real Toll, Long Op. History 4 
Pocahontas Parkway $600 99 None Real Toll w/ 5 yr Operating History 1 
Capital Beltway $2,100 80 Moderate Significant Real Toll, Managed Lane 1 
SH 130 Seg. 5&6 $1,300 50 Moderate Real Toll 2 
I-595 (FL) $1,830 35 Moderate None (Availability Payments) 2 
Port of Miami 




Express (NTE) $2,000 52 Moderate 
Significant Real 
Toll, Managed Lane 2 
I-635 (LBJ Freeway) $2,615 52 Moderate Significant Real Toll, Managed Lane 2 
Midtown Tunnel 
(VA) $2,100 58 High 
Real Toll, well 
understood 1 
Presidio Parkway 
(CA) $437 30 Moderate 
None (Availability 
Payments) 2 
I-95 HOT Lanes 
(VA) $940 76 Moderate 
Significant Real 
Toll, Managed Lane 1 
East End Crossings - 
East End $763 35 High 
None (Availability 
Payments) 3 
NTE Segments 3A & 
3B $1,650 52 Moderate 
None (Availability 
Payments) 1 
Goethals Bridge $1,300 40 High None (Availability Payments) 3 
US-36 $140 50 Moderate Significant, real toll, managed lane 2 
I-69 Section 5 $290 37 Moderate None (Availability Payments) 4 




Table 4: Development of Conditions side of the QCA Raw Data Table  
The same step should be taken for development of the outcome side of the raw data 
table. However, as discussed before assigning meaning to expected equity IRR and 
debt interest rate is not easy due to the existence of multiple variable and changes in 
market conditions. Table 5 summarizes the financing structure of the cases. 
Project characteristics have an impact on financial package, however, and financing 
elements are highly dependent on market conditions. Therefore, it is important to 
provide a benchmark to be able to understand market conditions at the time of 
financial close. This study has looked at three market benchmarks: LIBOR Swap 
Rates, Revenue Bond Index (RBI) and 30-year Rates. These benchmarks have been 
summarized in Table 5 and have been used to calculate the adjusted expected equity 










































95 to 125 
bp plus 
swap fees 
LIBOR + 85 
to 130 bp  
LIBOR 
+ 130 to 
170 bp 
term 30 year sub debt 20 years 30 years  30 years 

























swap with 3.6% 
fixed rate (LOC 













amount   $150.00 $589.00 $430.00 
pricing   5.16% 4.45% 4.46% 
term   
two tranches 






 amount $229.00 $770.00 $119.00 $350.00 $209.80 
















Swap Rates 4.09% 5.59% 5.59% 4.31% 3.39% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 4.92% 5.24% 5.24% 4.77% 5.17% 
30-Year 



























amount $780.00 $341.50    
pricing 
LIBOR + 






   
term 10 years 5 to 7 years    









amount   $400.00 $615.00 $663.75 




















amount $603.00 $341.00 $650.00 $850.00 $422.00 
pricing 3.64% 4.31% 4.52% 4.22% 3.18% 






 amount $207.70 $80.30 $427.00 $665.00 $272.00 
















Swap Rates 2.46% 2.68% 2.69% 2.29% 1.17% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 5.81% 4.81% 4.94% 4.84% 4.83% 
30-Year 

































amount $166.60     
pricing 
2.535% 
(LIBOR + 175 
bp)     
term 3.5 years     































amount $182.00 $300.00  $531.00 $473.67 
pricing 
0.46% for 




2.77%  3.84%  






 amount $45.60 $280.40 $78.10 $430.29 $106.82 
















Swap Rates 0.99% 0.85% 0.98% 1.76% 1.47% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 4.74% 4.54% 4.36% 5.27% 5.23% 
30-Year 


























 amount     $486.00 
pricing     4.04% 
term     4 to 9 years 








s amount $40.91 $251.76   
pricing 
$20.36M PABs at 
5.875% and $20.554 
Subordinated Loan at 
11%  
1.50% to 
5.00%   





amount $60.00   $949.00 
pricing 3.58%     
term 2044   
$130.7 due 
2023 and 






 amount $20.55 $40.45 $104.00 
















Rates 1.62% 1.8% 1.77% 
Revenue Bond 
Index 5.29% 4.98% 4.87% 
30-Year 
Treasury  3.66%   3.33%   3.37%  
 
 





The next step is development of the outcome side of the raw data table. There are 
three outcomes that are being studied in this dissertation: Equity IRR, Interest Rate on 
Debt and Financing Capacity or Leverage.  
It is usually hard to define the equity IRR for P3 projects in the United States, 
particularly since there are not many projects in the operation phase. Therefore, the 
Equity IRR in this study is usually referred to as the Expected Equity IRR under the 
base case financial model for equity that is usually developed during the procurement 
stage based on the anticipated traffic and revenue. This is often considered 
proprietary, so it is hard to have access to the exact Expected Equity IRR under this 
model. In addition, the Expected Equity IRR in different models may not truly be 
comparing similar actions since the timing of withdrawal on equity may change the 
overall Expected Equity IRR. In other words, equity investors may not invest their 
equity dollars in the project in the beginning years, but under the financial model it 
may be assumed that equity dollars are invested and used in the early years. These 
differences in the cash flow may create different Equity IRRs making the observed 
Equity IRR higher than the Expected Equity IRR under the base case equity model. 
The information used in this study has been collected through multiple sources. 
Although the Expected Equity IRR numbers used in this study may not be accurate to 
the decimal points, all efforts have been made to ensure that the most accurate 
available information has been used.  
To adjust equity IRR for timing impact, the Revenue Bond Index (RBI) has been used 




particular time. In other words, adjusted expected equity IRR is defined as the 
premium that equity investors are being paid over the RBI.  
In a similar way, the interest rate on debt is adjusted to provide similar comparisons 
between tax-exempt bonds, taxable bonds and bank debts at different maturities using 
the following steps:  
– Convert flexible rate bank loans to fixed rate bank loan: the LIBOR Swap 
Rate has been used to make this conversion. 
– Adjust all terms to an equivalent 30-year term: the difference between 
treasury rates for the longest term of debt and 30-year treasury rate has been 
used to convert all terms to 30 years 
– Adjust for taxes: taxable debt has been converted to a tax-exempt equivalent 
debt by reducing the interest rate by 15% which has been the rate selected the 
most common tax rate for long term investment.  
– Finally, the spread over adjusting tax-exempt and adjusted term fixed interest 
rates and the tax-exempt Revenue Bond Index has been calculated to adjust 
for the impact of time on interest rates.  
Appendix B shows these steps that will eventually lead to calculation of the 
equivalent 30-year tax-exempt time-adjusted bond interest rate. 
Many other factors, such as rating on bonds and market preferences for bonds over 
bank debt or short-term investments versus long-term investments, may impact 




practical methodology to develop approximate numbers based on available 
information. Since primarily use of the adjusted debt interest rate in this study is to 
screen/sort the projects by broad categories to be used in the QCA analysis, the 
accuracy of this method will be sufficient for the stated purpose. Table 6 summarizes 
the above discussion and shows the outcome side of the raw data table developed for 
















Chicago Skyway 7.38% 0.68% 13% 
Indiana Toll Road 7.76% 0.57% 19% 
Pocahontas Parkway 7.36% 0.62% 20% 
I-495 HOT Lanes 8.23% 0.58% 23% 
SH-130 Seg. 5&6 6.83% -0.84% 16% 
I-595 (FL) 5.73% 0.27% 13% 
Port of Miami Tunnel 6.52% 0.61% 11% 
North Tarrant Express (NTE) 8.18% 1.94% 29% 
I-635 (LBJ Freeway) 7.16% 2.16% 31% 
Midtown Tunnel (VA) 7.67% 0.67% 20% 
Presidio Parkway (CA) 9.72% -0.72% 12% 
I-95 HOT Lanes (VA) 8.46% -0.09% 34% 
East End Crossings (OH) 7.64% 0.65% 10% 
NTE Segments 3A & 3B 7.73% 1.48% 35% 
Goethals Bridge 8.57% 0.40% 10% 
US-36 8.39% 0.58% 17% 
I-69 Section 5 4.95% 0.02% 14% 
I-4 Managed Lanes 7.13% -0.25% 7% 
 7.52% 0.58% 18.56% Median 
 7.66% 0.62% 16.50% Average 
 





The final step in development of the raw data table is the assignment of values. The 
information in Table 2 has been used to transform data in Table 4 and Table 6 into the 
raw data table as shown in Table 6. The time-adjusted expected equity IRR has been 
defined as the spread over the RBI. The assumption used for achieving reduced 
expected equity IRR is having an adjusted IRR less than the average expected equity 
IRR (8%). This number is close to the average adjusted equity IRR (7.66%), yet it 
represents a natural gap that exists between 7.76% and 8.15%, making it more 
appropriate as the threshold separating data while having a balance between the 
number of cases that fall on each side of the threshold.  
The same concept has been used to find a threshold for adjusted debt interest rate. 
The natural gap between adjusted debt interest rates shows up between 68 bp and 148 
bp, which is slightly higher than the average adjusted debt interest rate of (62 bp). 
Therefore, 70 bp has been used as a threshold for debt interest rate.  
The assumption used for achieving maximum financing capacity with the lowest 
WACC is having the amount of equity 20% or less of the total amount of financing. 
This is due to the fact that there is a natural gap between 20% and 23%, making it a 
reasonable place to break the value, while this natural gap is still close to the mean 
(18.5%). 






 Conditions Outcomes 
CASE ID CAPEX Term CR-Risk TR-Risk Comp Equity Debt Leverage 
CHI-Skyway 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 
IND-Toll Rd 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 
Pocahontas 
 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
I-495 HOT 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 
SH-130 Seg.5&6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I-595 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Miami Tunnel 1 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 
NTE 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 
LBJ 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 
Midtown Tunnel 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 
Presidio Pkwy 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
I-95 HOT 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 
East End 
 
0 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 
NTE SEG3.A & 
 
1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 
Goethals Bridge 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 
US-36 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 
I-69 Section 5 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 
I-4 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 
 
Table 7: Preliminary QCA Configuration Table 
 
Internal Validity Testing 
 
The next step in development of the QCA Configuration Table is milestone checks 
regarding the validity of the preliminary QCA Configuration Table. This study 
conducts two main tests: the Intermediate QCA Tests and the Inter-Rater Reliability 
Test. 
Intermediate QCA Tests 
 
The first test is a quick visual test to ensure that the selected cases and variables 
provide enough diversity and sufficient variation for QCA. The criteria proposed by 




• Ensure that the selected cases and values provide more than minimal 
representation of both positive and negative outcomes. 
• Ensure that variables vary between cases 
• Ensure that cases provide sufficient diversity in terms of pairs of conditions 
• Avoid counterintuitive configurations in which all conditions are absent but 
an outcome is present.  
A quick review of Table 7 confirms that the above criteria exist in the preliminary 
QCA Configuration Table. Therefore, the table passes the Intermediate QCA tests 
successfully. However, a few observations can be made about the table: 
Six projects have similar conditions but they have conflicting outcomes. Further 
investigation is needed to better understand why these projects behave differently. 
– I-495 HOT Lanes and NTE Section 3A & 3B have the same conditions, 
however, they have different outcomes in terms of equity and debt.  
– Similarly, the Port of Miami Tunnel and Goethals Bridge have the same 
conditions with different equity outcomes.  
– NTE and LBJ are also similar in terms of conditions but they have resulted in 
different equity outcomes.  
Two projects have similar conditions and similar outcomes. Usually one of these 
projects should be eliminated from the table to minimize the number of similar cases; 





 Conditions Outcomes 
CASE ID CAPEX Term CR-Risk TR-Risk Comp Equity Debt Leverage 
CHI-Skyway 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 
IND-Toll Rd 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 
Pocahontas 
 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
I-495 HOT 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 
SH-130 Seg.5&6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I-595 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Miami Tunnel 1 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 
NTE 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 
LBJ 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 
Midtown Tunnel 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 
Presidio Pkwy 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
I-95 HOT 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 
East End 
 
0 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 
NTE SEG3.A & 
 
1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 
Goethals Bridge 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 
US-36 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 
I-69 Section 5 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 
I-4 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 
 
Table 8: Intermediate QCA Test Observations 
 
A quick review of the cases reveals that the traffic and revenue forecasts in some 
projects, such as NTE, LBJ, SH 130 Segments 5 & 6 and NTE Section 3A & 3B in 
Texas, are highly dependent on expected future traffic growth. On the other hand, 
some projects such as I-95 HOT Lanes already have a history of congestion and are 
based on traffic and revenue studies post economic crises. Therefore, they have more 
conservative forecasts with less risk.  
Based on the above discussion, the traffic risk on I-495 HOT lanes, SH-130 Segments 
5 & 6, I-95 HOT Lanes and US 36 have been reduced to a medium traffic risk with a 
value of 1 since all projects deal with congested corridors with proven level of 




In addition to adjustments to traffic risk, the construction risk of LBJ project was 
adjusted to a higher level (2) since LBJ and NTE Section NTE Sections 3A & 3B are 
both urban green-field projects. Table 9 shows the adjusted QCA Configuration Table 
based on the above discussion. 
 Conditions Outcomes 
CASE ID CAPEX Term CR-Risk TR-Risk Comp Equity Debt Leverage 
CHI-Skyway 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 
IND-Toll Rd 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 
Pocahontas 
 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
I-495 HOT 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
SH-130 S-5&6 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
I-595 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Miami Tunnel 1 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 
NTE 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 
LBJ 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 
Midtown Tunnel 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 
Presidio Pkwy 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
I-95 HOT 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
East End 
 
0 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 
NTE SEG. 3A & 
 
1 1 2 2 0 1 0 0 
Goethals Bridge 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 
US-36 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
I-69 Section 5 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 
I-4 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 
 
Table 9: Adjusted QCA Configuration Table 
 
The only two cases that still deliver contradictory outcomes with identical conditions 
are Port of Miami Tunnel and Goethals Bridge. This study recognizes this 
contradiction in the QCA Configuration Table, but moves forward with the analysis 
with the assumption that this contradiction will be further analyzed in the next chapter 




debt analysis has been performed on other factors that may have impacted those 
cases. 
Inter-Rater Reliability Test 
 
One of the most important factors in most scientific studies is to ensure that the 
analysis can be replicable with similar results. To check this factor, several 
practitioners in the P3 industry were asked to use the methodology proposed in this 
study to assign values to the variables for each case based on the information 
presented in Table 2 of this study.  At the end of this process, the values developed by 
practitioners were compared against each other and against the values developed in 
this study. As anticipated, the variation between the values assigned to the conditions 
was not significant; however, there was some variation in the values assigned to the 
equity and debt outcomes. After discussing the rationale behind development of 
values for debt and equity outcomes in this study, a consensus and concurrence was 




The analysis has been performed in two sets for the three outcomes. In one set, the 
logical remainders are included to reduce the results, and in the other set, it is not 
included to produce the more general results.   
The results are summarized in separate tables in this section. The first row of each 
table shows the QCA expression. The second row shows the transition based on the 




AND. Finally, the last row of each table provides the cases that match a particular 
expression.  
Reduced Adjusted Equity IRR 
 
The first part of analysis is finding logical patterns between conditions in different 
cases that result in achieving a reduced anticipated equity IRR. Without inclusion of 
remainders (hypothetical cases), the solution for Equity =1 is complex. As shown in 
the table 10 below, it is hard to find reasonable logical relationships between cases, 
and the results provide a wide range of answers with only one or two cases for each 
answer.  
Expression Cases 
Term{0} * CR-RISK{2} * TR-Risk{0} * Comp{2}   + (East End Crossing) 
Term{0} * CR-RISK{1} * TR-Risk{0} * Comp{2}  +  (I-69 Section 5  + I-4 ) 




CAPEX{0} *Term{1}*CR-RISK{0}* TR-Risk{1}* Comp{0}+ (Pocahontas Pkwy) 
CAPEX{1} *Term{1} *CR-RISK{1}* TR-Risk{1}* 
Comp{1}+ 
(SH-130  
Seg. 5 & 6) 
CAPEX{1} *Term{0} *CR-RISK{1}* TR-Risk{0}* 
Comp{1}+ (I-595 ) 
CAPEX{1} * Term{1} *CR-RISK{2}* TR-Risk{2}* 
Comp{1}+ (LBJ) 




CAPEX{1} * Term{1} *CR-RISK{2} * TR-Risk{2} * 
Comp{0} 
(NTE  
Seg. 3A & 3B) 
 






Inclusion of the hypothetical cases helps to achieve better solutions; however, the 
solutions are still very diverse as shown in Table 11. 
Expression Cases 
CR-RISK{0,2} + 
( CHI-Skyway, IND-Toll Rd + Pocahontas 
Pkwy + LBJ + Midtown Tunnel + East End 
Crossing + NTE SEG.A & 3B) 
Comp{2}+ ( CHI-Skyway, IND-Toll Rd + East End Crossing + I-69 Section 5 + I-4 ) 
CAPEX{1}TR-Risk{0,1} ( CHI-Skyway , IND-Toll Rd + SH -130 S-5&6 + I-595 + Midtown Tunnel + I-4 )   
 
Table 11: Analysis of Equity = 1 (with remainders and inclusion of contradictions for reduction) 
 
One the other hand, solving the QCA Configuration Table to explore what logical 
patterns in conditions may result in achieving higher expected equity IRR without 
inclusion of hypothetical cases results in diverse solutions again.  
Expression Cases 
CAPEX{1}* Term{1}* CR-RISK{1}* TR-Risk{2}* Comp{0} 
+ 
(I-495 HOT) 
CAPEX{1}* Term{1} * CR-RISK{1}* TR-Risk{2}* Comp{1} 
+ 
(NTE) 
CAPEX{0} * Term{0} * CR-RISK{1}* TR-Risk{0} * 
Comp{1} + 
(Presidio Pkwy) 
CAPEX{0}* Term{1} * CR-RISK{1} * TR-Risk{1}* Comp{0} 
+ 
(I-95 HOT ) 
CAPEX{0}* Term{1} * CR-RISK{1}* TR-Risk{1}* Comp{1} (US-36) 
 
Table 12: Analysis of Equity = 0 (without remainders with inclusion of contradictions for 
reduction) 
 










CR-RISK{1}TR-Risk{2}  + (I-495 HOT+NTE) 
CR-RISK{1}Comp{0} (I-495 HOT+I-95 HOT ) 
 
Table 13: Analysis of Equity = 0 (with remainders and inclusion of contradictions for reduction) 
 
Reduced Debt Interest Rate 
 
One of the goals in structuring financing package is reducing the interest rate on the 
debt. Without inclusion of remainders, the solution for Debt =1 represents the logical 
patterns between conditions existing of the existing cases resulting in an enhanced 
interest rate on debt as shown in Table 14. 
Expression Cases 
Term{1} * CR-RISK{1} * TR-Risk{1} * 
Comp{1}+ (SH -130 S-5&6, US 36) 
Term{0} *CR-RISK{1} * TR-Risk{0}* 
Comp{1}+ (I-595 +Presidio Pkwy) 
Term{0} *CR-RISK{2} * TR-Risk{0}* Comp{2} 
+ 
(Miami Tunnel, Goethals 
Bridge+ East End Crossing) 
Term{0} *CR-RISK{1} * TR-Risk{0}* Comp{2} 
+ (I-69 Section 5+I-4 ) 
CAPEX{1} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{0} * TR-
Risk{1} * Comp{2}+ ( CHI-Skyway, IND-Toll Rd) 
CAPEX{0} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{0} * TR-
Risk{1} * Comp{0}+ (Pocahontas Pkwy) 
CAPEX{1} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{1} * TR-
Risk{2} * Comp{0}+ (I-495 HOT) 
CAPEX{1} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{2} * TR-
Risk{1} * Comp{0}+ (Midtown Tunnel) 
CAPEX{0} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{1} * TR-
Risk{1} * Comp{0}+ (I-95 HOT ) 
 





Inclusion of the remainders narrows down the number of logical patterns that can 




( CHI-Skyway, IND-Toll Rd+ Pocahontas Pkwy+ SH -130 
S-5&6+I-595+Miami Tunnel, Goethals Bridge + Midtown 
Tunnel+ Presidio Pkwy+I-95 HOT +East End 
Crossing+US-36+I-69 Section 5+I-4 ) 
CR-
RISK{1}Comp{0} (I-495 HOT+I-95 HOT ) 
 
Table 15: Analysis of Debt = 1 (with remainders) 
  
To find the logical patterns between outcomes that can result in a higher debt interest 
rate, the QCA Configuration Table is solved for  Debt =0 without inclusion of the 
remainders as shown in Table 16. 
Expression Cases 
CAPEX{1} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{1} * TR-Risk{2} * 
Comp{1}+ 
(NTE) 
CAPEX{1} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{2} * TR-Risk{2} * 
Comp{1}+ 
(LBJ) 
CAPEX{1} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{2} * TR-Risk{2} * 
Comp{0} 
(NTE SEG.A & 
3B)  
Table 16: Analysis of Debt = 0 (without remainders)      
  
The solution for Debt=0 with inclusion of the remainders is simpler. The two logical 






CR-RISK{2}TR-Risk{2}+ (LBJ+NTE SEG.A & 3B) 
TR-Risk{2}Comp{1} (NTE+LBJ) 
 
Table 17: Analysis of Debt = 0 (with remainders) 
 
Maximized Financing Capacity (Leverage) 
 
In addition to reducing expected equity IRR and debt interest rate, in an efficient 
financial package, the Weighted Average Cost of Capital should be minimized by 
maximizing the amount of the cheaper form of financing. In other words, since 
interest rate on debt is cheaper than expected equity IRR, and usually the financing 
capacity is maximized by maximizing the amount of debt, or maximizing leverage. 
To find out how this objective can be achieved, the QCA Configuration Table has 
been solved to find the solutions for Leverage =1 without inclusion of reminders as 
shown in Table 18. 
Expression Cases 
Term{1} * CR-RISK{1} * TR-Risk{1} * Comp{1} + (SH -130 S. 5&6, US 36) 
Term{0} * CR-RISK{1} * TR-Risk{0} * Comp{1} + (I-595 +Presidio Pkwy) 
Term{0} * CR-RISK{2} * TR-Risk{0} * Comp{2} + 
(Miami Tunnel,  
Goethals Bridge + 
East End Crossing) 
Term{0} * CR-RISK{1} * TR-Risk{0} * Comp{2} + (I-69 Section 5+I-4 ) 




CAPEX{0} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{0} * TR-Risk{1} * 
Comp{0} + (Pocahontas Pkwy) 
CAPEX{1} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{2} * TR-Risk{1} * 
Comp{0} + (Midtown Tunnel) 
 





Solving the QCA Configuration Table for Leverage=1 with remainders reduced the 
number of solutions to four as shown in Table 19.  
Expression Cases 
Term{0}+ (I-595 + Miami Tunnel, Goethals Bridge+ Presidio Pkwy + East End Crossing + I-69 Section 5 + I-4 ) 
CR-RISK{0}+ ( CHI-Skyway, IND-Toll Rd+ Pocahontas Pkwy) 
CAPEX{0}Comp{1}+ (Presidio Pkwy+US-36) 
CAPEX{1}TR-Risk{1} ( CHI-Skyway, IND-Toll Rd + SH -130 Seg. 5 & 6 + Midtown Tunnel) 
 
Table 19: Analysis of Leverage = 1 (with remainders) 
 
The last step of analysis in this study intends to find the logical patterns than prevent 
achieving the objective of maximizing financing capacity. The solutions for solving 
the QCA Configuration Table for Leverage=0 without remainders are shown in Table 
20.  
Expression Cases 
CAPEX{1} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{1} * TR-Risk{2} * 
Comp{0}+ 
(I-495 HOT) 
CAPEX{1} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{1} * TR-Risk{2} * 
Comp{1}+ 
(NTE) 
CAPEX{1} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{2} * TR-Risk{2} * 
Comp{1}+ 
(LBJ) 
CAPEX{0} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{1} * TR-Risk{1} * 
Comp{0}+ 
(I-95 HOT ) 
CAPEX{1} * Term{1} * CR-RISK{2} * TR-Risk{2} * 
Comp{0} 
(NTE SEG.A & 
3B) 
 





Solving the QCA Configuration Table for Leverage =0 with remainders narrows 
down number of logical patterns into only two. These two solutions are shows in 
Table 21.   
    
Expression Cases 
TR-Risk{2}+ (I-495 HOT+NTE+LBJ+NTE SEG.A & 3B) 
CR-RISK{1}Comp{0} (I-495 HOT+I-95 HOT) 
 




This chapter has documents regarding how the QCA Configuration Data has been 
developed and tested to ensure the accuracy of variables (5 conditions and 3 
outcomes). In addition, this chapter has solved the QCA Configuration Data 12 times 
(4 times for each one of the 3 outcomes). The study has found results on what logical 
patterns in conditions may result in a favorable condition of an outcomes or an 
unfavorable condition of the outcomes, once only with the information from the 
existing cases and once with simplifying assumptions to create hypothetical cases 








Chapter 5:  Interpretation and Discussion of the Results 
 
This chapter intends to evaluate the results that were reported in the previous chapter 
in order to better understand the logical patterns between conditions and outcomes. 
The ultimate goal of this chapter is to provide meaningful guidance that can be used 
to generalize the findings of this study and use them in other cases. To do so, this 
study will discuss and further investigate the results for each outcome individually. 
 





W/O Remainders 9  Solutions 
W Remainders 3 Solutions 
0 
W/O Remainders 5 Solutions 
W Remainders 3 Solutions 
Debt 
1 
W/O Remainders 9 Solutions 
W Remainders 2 Solutions 
0 
W/O Remainders 3Solutions 
W Remainders 2 Solutions 
Leverage 
1 
W/O Remainders 7 Solutions 
W Remainders 4 Solutions 
0 
W/O Remainders 5 Solutions 




Figure 8 shows the summary of the QCA solutions for each one of the outcomes with 
or without remainders. A quick review of the table reveals that the minimum number 
of solutions (2) occurs for Debt=1, Debt=0 and Liquidity=0 while using remainders. 
The maximum number of solutions (9) occurs for Debt = 1, Equity =1 and Equity=0 
without remainders. In addition, the 4 scenarios for Equity produce 20 solutions 
together while the 4 scenarios for Debt and Leverage produce 16 and 18 solutions, 
respectively. Since the higher the number of solutions, the less accurate each 
solutions is (representing a pattern between less number of cases), it seems that the 
solutions for Leverage and Debt represent better logical patterns than the solutions for 
Equity. Therefore, in the following sections of this chapter first the solutions for 
Leverage and Debt will be further investigated to identify logical patterns, and then 
Equity will be discussed. 
In analysis of each outcome, the most common patterns will be discussed. To select 
the most common patterns, the solutions representing more number of cases are 
considered. Since inclusion of remainders simplifies the solutions and identifies more 
general patterns that can be seen in multiple cases, most of the solutions considered 
for further discussion and interpretation in this chapter are solutions with the 
remainders. However, solutions without remainders are reviewed as well when 
necessary to better understand the logical patterns.  
Leverage 
 
One of the outcomes that has been studied in this dissertation is the leverage. In other 




more debt which is usually cheaper than equity, and what other conditions the project 
should be financed at a higher percentage of equity in the overall financing package. 
The assumption is that the higher the leverage, the lower the overall financing cost 
which may result in a higher financing capacity for a P3 project. 
Table 22 shows the most logical patterns that can be seen in the results for solving the 
QCA Configuration Table for Liquidity.   
ID Solution for Expression Cases 
1 
Leverage =1 
W Remainders Term{0} 
(I-595 + Miami Tunnel, Goethals 
Bridge+ Presidio Pkwy + East End 
Crossing + I-69 Section 5 + I-4 ) 
2 Leverage =0 
W Remainders TR-Risk{2} 
(I-495 HOT+NTE+LBJ+NTE 
SEG.A & 3B) 




( CHI-Skyway, IND-Toll Rd + SH 
-130 S-5&6 + Midtown Tunnel) 
4 
Leverage =1 
W Remainders CR-RISK{0} 
( CHI-Skyway, IND-Toll Rd+  
Pocahontas Pkwy) 
 
Table 22: Most Common Logical Patterns for Liquidity 
 
The most common pattern is “Term{0}” for Leverage = 1, which can be seen in 7 
cases and represents a project duration of less than 50 years. In other words, this 
solution means the percentage of equity in overall financing package is lower in 




The second ranked common pattern is “TR-Risk{2}” for Leverage = 0, which can be 
seen in 4 cases and represents a significant traffic risk. In other words, this solution 
means that when there is significant traffic risk, the percentage of equity in the overall 
financing package will be higher. This is a logical conclusion since equity is usually 
more risk seeking than debt. 
The third pattern is “CAPEX{1}TR-Risk{1}” for Leverage=1 which means when 
project cost is high but there is a good understanding and history of traffic patterns 
and demand, a significant portion of the financing package will still be debt.   
The last pattern that is presented in Table 22 is “CR-RISK{0}” for Leverage=1. In 
other words, in a project with no or very limited construction risk, a brown-field 
project, lenders are more willing to offer a loan to the project.  
In general, it can be concluded that the percentage of debt in the financing package of 
a P3 project can be maximized when there is no or limited construction risk and 
traffic risk. This explains why P3 projects are usually refinanced after construction is 
completed and the project has gone through its ramp-up period.  
Debt 
 
Debt usually covers the majority of the P3 financing package. Therefore, the interest 
rate on debt has a significant impact on overall financing capacity of the project. 
However, it is important to point out that the interest rate on debt is a function of two 




that is usually added to the risk-free interest rate to account for the risk profile that the 
lender is taking. As discussed before, other factors such as the pay back term, tax 
treatments of the earned interest, etc., may increase or decrease the overall interest 
rate.  As discussed in section 4.2 of this dissertation, a methodology has been 
developed in this study to convert the interest rate on different types of debt in the 
cases studied in this dissertation into an equivalent 30-year tax-exempt time-adjusted 
bond interest rate. In this section, different patterns that may contribute to a higher 
interest rate and different patterns that contribute to a lower interest rate are discussed 
based on the QCA results. 
ID Solution for Expression Cases 
1 Debt =1 W Remainders TR-Risk{0,1} 
( CHI-Skyway, IND-Toll Rd+ 
Pocahontas Pkwy+ SH -130 S-
5&6+I-595+Miami Tunnel, 
Goethals Bridge + Midtown 
Tunnel+ Presidio Pkwy+I-95 HOT 
+East End Crossing+US-36+I-69 
Section 5+I-4 )  
2 
Debt = 1 
W/O 
i d  
Term{0} *CR-RISK{2} 
* TR-Risk{0}* 
C {2}  
(Miami Tunnel, Goethals Bridge+ 
East End Crossing) 
3 Debt =0 W Remainders 
CR-RISK{2}TR-
Risk{2} (LBJ+NTE SEG.A & 3B) 
 
Table 23: Most Common Logical Patterns for Debt 
One general observation about the QCA analysis is on Debt is the lack of a general 
pattern that represents more than two cases, making it hard to make any 




most common patterns that lead to a low interest rate on debt or a high interest rate on 
debt.  
The first pattern, “TR-Risk {0,1}”, which is also the most common pattern occurs in 
14 cases for Debt =1 which makes it a very strong pattern.  The expression in this 
pattern means no traffic risk (usually seen in availability payment deals) or low-traffic 
risk (usually seen in mature roads with a proven traffic history and demand), which 
contributes to a relatively lower interest rate on debt.  
The second pattern that is shown in the table for Debt=1 is a relatively complicated 
pattern “Term{0} *CR-RISK{2} * TR-Risk{0}* Comp{2}”. This expression means 
for the  projects with relatively shorter terms, high construction risk, low traffic risk 
and high competition, a relatively good interest rate was achieved on debt. A good 
observation in this expression is the existence of the no traffic risk again. It seems that 
lenders are very sensitive to traffic risk, but they can get comfortable with 
construction risk as long as it can be managed. A review of the contractual 
agreements of the three projects that have this pattern reveals that all three projects 
have sufficient levels of security package (as a combination of performance bonds, 
payment bonds, insurance, letter of credit and/or liquidity fund) or contractual risk 
sharing mechanisms with the owner (such as usage of Geotechnical Baseline Report 
(GBR) to cap unforeseen geotechnical conditions, delay and compensation events, 
force major events, etc.) to reduce the impact of unexpected risks on the project. This 
pattern is aligned with the discussion in Chapter 2 of this dissertation where the role 




enhancement is designed to either reduce the traffic and revenue risk or the 
construction risk. 
The last pattern presented in Table 23 represents conditions, “CR-RISK{2}TR-
Risk{2}” that result in not achieving a good interest rate on debt, Debt=0. This 
pattern explains that in projects with significant risk in terms of traffic and revenue 
and significant risk in terms of construction, usually the interest rate on debt is higher 
than other projects. The difference between this pattern and the previous pattern is 
occurrence of traffic and revenue risk and construction risk simultaneously, which is 
probably the main reason that lenders increase their rates. A comparison between this 
pattern and the previous pattern may suggest that one way to decrease the interest rate 
on debt in P3 projects with significant risk may be using availability payment models 
to deliver them instead of a toll concession model, or to use significant credit 
enhancements to reduce the risk profile of the project in regard to traffic risk and 
construction risk from a level 2 (significant) to level 1 (moderate).  
Equity 
 
The results for this outcome are probably the most controversial results among the 
three outcomes. As shown in Table 10, without inclusion of remainders, it is hard to 
find any particular pattern that achieves a reduced adjusted Expected IRR and this 
repeats in more than 2 projects. However, with inclusion of remainders, some patterns 
rise to the top by repeating in multiple projects; however, still some logical 




Table 24 summarizes those patterns that have been selected for further discussion in 
this section. 
ID Solution for Expression Cases 
1 Equity =1 W Remainders CR-RISK{0,2}  
( CHI-Skyway, IND-Toll Rd + Pocahontas 
Pkwy + LBJ + Midtown Tunnel + East End 
Crossing + NTE SEG.A & 3B) 
 Equity =1 W Remainders 
CAPEX{1}TR-
Risk{0,1} 
( CHI-Skyway , IND-Toll Rd + SH -130 S-
5&6 + I-595 + Midtown Tunnel + I-4 )   
2 Equity =1 W Remainders Comp{2} 
( CHI-Skyway, IND-Toll Rd + East End 
Crossing + I-69 Section 5 + I-4 ) 
4 Equity =0 W Remainders CR-RISK{1}Comp{0} (I-495 HOT+I-95 HOT ) 
5 Equity =0 W Remainders 
CR-RISK{1}TR-
Risk{2}   (I-495 HOT+NTE) 
 
Table 24: Most Common Logical Patterns for Equity 
The first pattern is “CR-RISK{0,2}“, which means when there is little construction 
risk, or when there is significant construction risk, the time-adjusted expected equity 
IRR is relatively lower. There is a logical gap in this solution since there is no good 
explanation why projects with moderate construction risk may increase equity IRR 
while projects with limited or significant construction risk do not. Therefore, it is 
difficult to use this pattern as a general pattern that can explain when the expected 
equity IRR may be relatively lower in P3 projects.  
The second pattern is “CAPEX{1}TR-Risk{0,1}”, which suggests that when the 




expected equity IRR is relatively lower. This pattern is seen in six cases, which 
suggests a strong correlation exists between this pattern and the case bank.  
The third pattern is “Comp{2}” which suggests that when there is a high competition, 
the expected equity IRR is relatively lower in P3 projects.  
The fourth patterns is “CR-RISK{1}Comp{0}”, which means when there is a 
moderate construction risk but no competition, the expected equity IRR increases. 
Similarly, the fifth pattern, “CR-RISK{1}TR-Risk{2}”, suggests that a significant 
revenue risk combined with moderate construction risk can significantly can increase 
expected equity IRR. 
The above discussion can be summarized as follows: 
• High competition and low traffic risk can help reduce expected equity IRR 
• Low competition and high traffic risk and medium construction risk can 
increase the expected equity IRR. 
As noted earlier, some logical contradictions exist in the results as well as in the 
variables in the QCA Configuration Table, which require additional investigation to 
better understand how expected equity IRR behaves under different conditions. In the 






Special Discussion on Equity IRR 
 
The most expensive form of capital in P3 projects is equity. The Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) on equity investment is one of the major elements that determines the 
overall equity capacity of a P3 project as explained in equation (2) in Chapter 1 of 
this study. The question is how equity investors make decisions on the IRR on their 
investment and how the IRR can be reduced. 
Expected Equity IRR in P3 Projects  
 
In a P3 delivery model, a stand-alone project company is formed, a Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV), with limited ties to the parent company(s) to assume certain design, 
construction, finance, operation and/or maintenance risks. The SPV is responsible for 
delivering the project’s financing package, which normally includes a combination of 
debt, equity and public funds. The debt is backed by forecasted cash flows from the 
project, either in form of toll revenue or availability payments. Lenders typically 
require equity contributions from the SPV’s parent companies in order to provide a 
cushion to absorb some financial risks in the event that the actual revenues are below 
forecasted revenues (Reinhardt, 2011).  
Some of the credit enhancements discussed in the previous chapter reduce the 
investment risk not only for lenders, but also for equity investors; therefore, if the 
decision on equity IRR is based on the level of risk that equity investors are taking, 
reducing the risk profile should potentially reduce the equity IRR in P3 projects. 
However, since equity investors assume more risk in a P3 project, they require a 




question is how investors set their anticipated rate of return on equity and how it can 
be reduced. 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
 
One way to analyze how investors may adjust the equity IRR in a supply and demand 
market is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which was developed based on 
the work of William Sharpe, in his 1970 book "Portfolio Theory and Capital 
Markets”. This method has been widely used in literature as a systematic way to 
understand returns based on the systematic risk and unsystematic risk as defined in 
equation (4): 
K =  Rf +  ß (Rm –  Rf)                                                        (4) 
where: 
o K = Required return 
o Rf = Risk-free rate 
o Rm = Return of overall “market” (i.e., S&P 500) 
o ß (beta): security’s beta risk measure defined as 𝝈𝒎/ 𝝈𝟐 where σm is the 
covariance of returns of asset a compared to market returns σ2 is the 
variance of market returns. 
 
 
Based on the above discussion, the Expected Equity IRR should be a function of risk-
free rate of return, overall market return and asset characteristics. As shown in Figure 
9, the Expected Equity IRR has changed over time for different P3 projects; however, 
this change is not similar to the change in rate of return on other securities such as 
LIBOR rates, U.S. treasury rates, and Bond Buyer Revenue Bond Index (RBI). In 
some projects the spread between the rate of return on RBI and the rate of return on 




Crossing, which was closed in 2013. In some cases, this difference has widened to 
almost 10%, for instance in the financing package for the Presidio Parkway project. 
Therefore, the trend in equity IRR in P3 projects in the United States is not 
necessarily following the trend in the capital market (for instance, RBI or treasury 
rates).  
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The risk-free rate and the return of overall market conditions are functions of the 
financial market and impact both bond rates and expected equity IRR, therefore they 
should not be the major factor in differentiation between security rates and Expected 
Equity IRR. Thus, the only factor that is left is project characteristics. Next section of 
this study will divide the cases into availability payment and toll concession cases to 
further analyze how Expected Equity IRR may be related to traffic and revenue risk. 
Excepted Equity IRR in Toll Concession and Availability Deals 
 
As discussed earlier, the CAPM suggests that the variations in the difference between 
security rates and the Expected Equity IRR in P3 projects is because of the 
differences between the levels of risk that equity investors take in different P3 
projects. For instance, the revenue risk assumed by investors in a toll concession may 
be different than a revenue risk assumed by investors in an availability payment deal. 
Figure 10 shows the difference between Expected Equity IRR and Time-Adjusted 
Expected Equity IRR for projects with no traffic risk (availability payment) and 





Figure 10: Expected Equity IRR for Toll Concessions vs. Availability Payments 
 












Mean 12.68 7.74 11.44 6.47 
Min/Max Difference 1.68 1.72 7.46 7.08 
Standard Deviation 0.55 0.62 2.48 2.34 
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A quick review of Figure 10 and Table 25 reveals a few interesting observation: 
• It seems that on average both the Expected Equity IRR and Time-Adjusted 
Expected Equity IRR for toll concession projects are slightly higher than for 
availability payment projects (about 120 bps). 
• In some cases the Expected Equity IRR and the Time-Adjusted Expected 
Equity IRR for availability payment projects are higher than toll concession 
projects (i.e., Presidio Parkway and Goethals Bridge) 
• The difference between high and low Expected Equity IRR in toll concession 
is only around 170 bps; however, this difference for availability payment 
projects is more than 700 bps. 
• The standard deviation for availability payment deals is substantially higher 
than the standard deviation for toll concession deals. In general, it seems that 
the Expected Equity IRR in toll concession projects is more or less within a 
reasonable range; however, in availability payment projects it varies 
substantially from one project to the other.   
Therefore, it is hard to believe that calculation of the Expected Equity IRR in P3 
projects is consistent with the CAPM, particularly in availability payment deals. The 
question is “what determines the Expected Equity IRR in P3 deals”? Is it 





Competition and Excepted Equity IRR  
 
As discussed earlier, the equity investment market in P3 deals may not follow the 
rules of a free market. There might be different explanations for this finding. The 
complexity of the financial structure, the transaction cost of P3 procurements is 
relatively high and thus, a P3 model is usually only used when delivering a relatively 
large-scale project with significant financing needs and a complex risk structure 
(Farajian, 2010). As a result, only a few banks and equity investment funds (normally 
labeled as infrastructure funds) have the necessary capacities to invest in P3 projects 
as equity holders. Thus, the largest infrastructure equity funds control most of the 
equity in P3 projects and create a semi-monopoly market, which could eventually 
lead to monopolistic claims and behaviors.  












Mean 12.74 7.71 11.34 6.42 
Min/Max Difference 2.92 3.99 6.80 5.94 
Standard Deviation 0.85 1.08 2.67 2.32 
 
Table 26: Effect of Competition on Expected Equity IRR 
The above table confirms that competition in general reduces the Expected Equity 
IRR by about 130 bps; however, one interesting observation is that the lowest and 
highest Expected Equity IRRs in both categories are availability payment projects (I-
595 and Presidio Parkway as projects with low competition, and I-69 Section 5 and 




It should be mentioned that this study has categorized projects based on the level of 
competition during procurement. However, a competitive procurement process may 
still lack competition at equity investment level, since the proposal price submitted by 
each bidder is subject to multiple prices such as (design-build, operation and 
maintenance, etc.) and multiple financing elements (such as estimated traffic and 
revenue, haircut given by rating agencies, debt service coverage ratio, reserve 
accounts, type of debt, interest rate on debt, liquidity and equity IRR, etc.). In 
addition, the evaluation criteria may not be based on the best pricing and financing 
package, but instead based on the best value which may make the winning bid not the 
best bid as it relates to the financial elements. Therefore, the winning bids used in the 
cases considered for this study may not necessary have the lowest Expected Equity 
IRR. The real question is: How may the P3 procurement current model be enhanced 
to encourage competition at equity level? 
Unfortunately under the current P3 model, only a few investment funds and 
concessionaires have the financial capacity to invest in P3 projects, which are usually 
large in terms of capital investment; small investors have no opportunities for direct 
equity investment in the project. The recent innovative mechanism of crowdfunding, 
which has been already utilized in other sectors such as real estate development and 
small start-up IT ventures, introduces an opportunity to enhance the current P3 model. 
Enhancing the model can provide opportunities to broaden the pool of potential 
equity investors and allow for a real competition at equity level which may reduce the 
Expected Equity IRR for P3 projects. The next chapter of this study introduces a new 




Chapter 6:  Application for Policy and Practice  
 
 
A New Innovative Approach: Crowdfunding  
 
Critics of P3s oftentimes refer to this monopoly issue by challenging the high rate of 
return on the project’s equity investments and the limited opportunity to invest equity 
in a project with such a return. This limited opportunity is only offered to few 
infrastructure funds who can afford large equity investments, while the general public 
cannot enjoy similar returns when they may be willing to accept similar risk profiles 
(Sanger & Crawley, 2009).  
At its basis, crowdfunding is a tool used to raise money for a project or venture from 
a group of individuals (Levine & Feigin, 2014). As a practice, crowdfunding has a 
long history, including the fundraising effort conducted by Joseph Pulitzer in 1885 to 
fund the pedestal on which the Statue of Liberty platform now stands (Davies, 2014). 
With the growing popularity of the internet transactions, crowdfunding started to 
emerge “as an online extension of traditional financing by friends and family: 
communities pool money to fund members with business ideas,” (The World Bank, 
2013). Recently coined by Michael Sullivan in 2006 (Gobble, 2012), crowdfunding 
has evolved to refer to the act of raising capital for a project or venture from the 
general public (the crowd) through an intermediary online platform.  
It is a concept at the intersection of crowdsourcing and microfinance (Manchanda & 
Muralidharan, 2014). Crowdsourcing enables firms to solicit the collective wisdom of 




solutions to problems or outsource work (Misra, Gooze, Watkins, Asad, & Le Dantec, 
2014). Microfinancing instruments issue small, unsecured loans to individuals for 
starting or expanding businesses (Khavul, 2010).  Thus, “crowdfunding could be 
described as a method to establish the connection between entrepreneurs, who aim to 
raise capital, and novel investors, who form an emerging source of capital and are 
willing to invest small amounts, through internet-based intermediaries,” (Valanciene 
and Jegeleviciute, 2013). While various definitions for the notion of crowdfunding 
differ slightly based upon the author’s perspective (see Table 1), they all incorporate 
three involved parties. These parties are: (1) the entrepreneurs (the fundraisers); (2) 
the investors (the crowd); and (3) the intermediaries (the online platforms). 
Crowdfunding Market 
 
Over the past five years, crowdfunding has become a common term in the start-up 
world through the rise of online platforms, such as Kickstarter and IndieGoGo, to 
raise money for new ventures. In 2012, 1.1 million worldwide crowdfunding 
campaigns raised $2.7 billion in donations, in which $1.6 billion was raised in North 
America. Today, crowdfunding “has reached a market size of approximately $5.1 
billion per year either in form of donation, reward, equity, lending or royalty-based,” 
(Massolution, 2013).  
The crowdfunding market can be separated into two categories: (1) “crowdfunding,” 
which includes donation and reward; and (2) “crowdfunding investment,” which 
includes equity, lending and royalty-based (The World Bank, 2013). Many of the 




were donations given to an entrepreneur to monetarily support an idea or new venture 
(Levine and Feigin, 2014). As part of the financial reforms after the 1929 stock 
market crash, Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations in the United 
States became much stricter. Consequentially, crowdfunding investment became 
illegal, the solicitation of equity investments outside a circle of "accredited 




In the United States, the legislative and regulatory environment in regards to 
crowdfunding is changing rapidly to loosen some of the restrictions on crowdfunding 
investment, which resulted from the 1929 reforms. On April 5, 2012, President 
Barack Obama signed into law the JOBS Act. This Act has made crowdfunding 
investment legal and resulted in reduced SEC regulatory requirements and filings for 
businesses below certain monetary thresholds, as well as other regulatory rollbacks. 
The intention of the Act is to allow small and start-up businesses to access the power 
of the crowds and address the lack of traditional funding sources, such as bank loans 
(Gobble, 2012). The JOBS Act attracted bipartisan support because both parties 
agreed that small businesses are the largest source of new jobs in the United States 
and start-up businesses are a key catalyst for long-term economic recovery. A key 
result of the JOBS Act is entrepreneurs can legally crowdfund their businesses and 
offer equities rather than just rewards (Ramsey, 2012). Thus, crowdfunding can not 
7 An “accredited investor” includes any individual who: (1) earned an income exceeding $200,000 in 
each of the prior two years; or (2) has a net worth over $1 million (SEC, 2013). 
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only be used as a philanthropic source of capital, but also as an investment or 
financial mechanism to address lack of traditional funding for projects and new 
ventures (Davies, 2014). While literature exists on the JOBS Act and resulting 
changes in SEC legislation, a detailed policy analysis on these changes is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
Recent legislative changes in the United States as a result of the JOBS Act focus on 
the potential to use crowdfunding as a means of raising capital for small and start-up 
businesses. Consequentially, little attention has been given to the potential to use 
crowdfunding for “civic projects – projects involve either directly or indirectly, the 
use of government funds, assets or sponsorship, which may include the development 
of public assets,” (Davies, 2014). While little attention is given to crowdfunding as a 
financing mechanism to address a shortage of funding for civic projects, it has been 
used at local levels mainly for green space projects, such as parks and renewable 
energy (Davies, 2014). Most of these projects have been relatively small in terms of 
scope; however, the potential scope and benefits could be large. For instance, every 
$1 spent on transportation infrastructure results in a $1.5-$2 direct and indirect 
economic boost (Carew & Mandel, 2014).  
Application 
 
Under the current P3 model, each bidding team submits a project proposal, including 
a committed financial plan, which details the anticipated combination of debt and 
equity. Equity is provided either by the concessionaire, primary contractor and/or 




selected team will be responsible for delivering the committed financial plan. If a P3 
project were enhanced by crowdfunding, then a new layer of financing could be 
added between debt and equity and defined as the “equity share” layer. Under this 
enhanced model, bidding teams would need to include the assumption that a 
minimum portion of the equity investment, as required and specified by the 
sponsoring agency in the procurement documents, is to be crowdfunded in the 
committed financial plan. Thus, equity shares of the P3 project could be crowdfunded 
to interested general investors. Similar to equity partners, these general investors 
could gain a return on their investment reflecting the project’s rate of return and 
including the project’s potential upside rewards. The general investors, however, will 
not have a voting right and will bear a similar risk profile as the equity partners. This 
process requires: (1) offering of equity shares through a P3 crowdfunding platform; 
(2) pricing; and (3) transaction documentation and after sale services.  
– Offering 
Under this approach, the preferred bidder would offer equity investment through an 
online platform, which provides the necessary information to investors. This offering 
can be conducted in multiple stages. For instance, equity shares can be first offered to 
people who are users of the facility or local to the area or state, and then any 
remaining shares can be offered nationally or internationally. To perform this 
investment offering, a platform needs to be created that can accurately manage the 
transactions. The need to build an online platform specific to crowdfunding for P3 




would be in charge of prequalifying investors, sharing project information, 
conducting the transaction, and keeping track of documents. This study does not 
intend to explore the technical discussion regarding the development and operation of 
a platform, but recognizes the need for additional research in this area.  
– Pricing  
As discussed previously, equity share investors through crowdfunding will own a 
similar risk profile as the senior equity investors; therefore, the reward profile would 
also be similar to the senior equity investors. Crowdfunding opens up the door for 
new investors and changes the semi-monopoly characteristic of the equity market into 
a more competitive market. Thus, the rate of return on equity investment could 
potentially decrease as a result of competition and an increase in equity supply. 
Therefore, one could argue the overall rate of return on equity would potentially be 
slightly less than what we see in the market under the current P3 model. Additional 
research is needed to better understand market reaction to the equity crowdfunding 
approach for P3s. 
– Transaction documentation 
Since equity shareholders take a greater level of risk as compared to bondholders, 
additional information related to the concessionaire and certain risks taken by the 
equity shareholders would be disclosed publicly to interested investors on the 
crowdfunding platform. This disclosure is not only a necessity from an investing 




publicly accessible on the platform for interested investors include: the project risk 
register; all publicly available procurement documents; any available Public Offering 
Statement or Official Statement for bonds; contract agreement documents; and project 
studies, such as the traffic and revenue study. The audited financial statements and 
other relevant information regarding the concessionaire would also be shared with the 
potential equity shareholders. Requirements to disclose documents, however, are not 
limited to the period before investment. Updated documents, quarterly progress 
reports or any other relevant documentation would also be provided to equity 
shareholders after the investment is made to give investors necessary information to 
evaluate the performance of their investment. 
 
Valuation of Equity Crowdfunding in P3s: SWOT Analysis 
 
In order to investigate and evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed structure, a 
systematic approach should be utilized to analyze the associated benefits and 
challenges. The SWOT analysis is a well know qualitative research methodology that 
provides a comprehensive discussion on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats of a theory or idea. The study focuses the SWOT analysis on the key benefits 
and drawbacks of using a crowdfunding enhanced P3 model in comparison to the 
current P3 model, which restricts equity investment in a project to only institutional 
investors. This effort will first focus on the strengths and weaknesses, which are 
internal in origin and result from the incorporation of crowdfunding into the P3 
model. Secondly, the analysis will describe the opportunities and threats, which are 




The opportunities are aspects of the environment that improve the method and enable 
the method to deliver a better value. The threats are aspects of the environment that 
may negatively impact this approach and decrease performance. Finally, the 
conclusion ties the different aspects together and describes how they are interrelated. 
Strengths 
 
– Return on equity 
Providing investment opportunity to general public, especially to local communities, 
changes the current monopolistic market for equity investment in P3s and creates a 
competitive supply and demand market, which could potentially result in lower rate 
of returns. This change will potentially reduce the financing cost for P3 projects, 
making them cheaper and more bankable. Under the proposed approach, only a 
portion of equity will be invested using crowdfunding and thus the SPV will still have 
a long-term vested interest in the project. Therefore, the interests of the SPV will be 
aligned with the interests of equity shareholders, which results in integrity to the 
overall structure.  
– Equal investment opportunity 
The equity crowdfunding approach for P3s will provide investment opportunity in P3 
projects to the general public, especially local communities. Anyone who can legally 
make crowdfunding investments will be able to invest in P3 projects enhanced by 
crowdfunding, and take the risk and the rewards that infrastructure funds take. This 




P3 projects. For instance, Ellen Dannin (2011), a law professor at Penn State 
University has reviewed a number of P3 contracts and has concluded that the level of 
risk transferred to private infrastructure investors is not as nearly as much as it has 
been advertised to the public particularly in terms of “(1) compensation events; (2) 
noncompetition provisions; and (3) the contractor’s right to object to and receive 
compensation for legislative, administrative, and judicial decisions”. The equity 
crowdfunding will also provide the opportunity for local and national residents to 
keep a P3 project’s economic benefits resulting from the investment return within 
their community, state or nation before these benefits are realized overseas by foreign 
investors.  
– Enhanced stakeholder support 
P3 projects are usually long term and complex; they involve different stakeholders 
who can help enhance the delivery of the project or hinder the delivery by imposing 
unnecessary delays and expenses on the project. In particular, an enhanced support 
from general public, localities, public agencies, elected officials and/or special 
interest groups can be a catalyst for reducing political and social risks associated with 
the project. The proposed equity crowdfunding P3 model provides the opportunity to 
align the interest of local investors and communities with the interest of the SPV, 
lenders and the sponsoring public agency in order to deliver the project on time and 
on budget. The combined wisdom of the crowd developed as a result of additional 




democratic society could minimize political risks and associated unnecessary delays 
and expenses.  
– Increased transparency 
Since P3 procurements usually take a different route compared to traditional 
procurements and have more complexity which makes them more difficult to 
understand, they have been criticized to not be transparent enough. The proposed 
equity crowdfunding structure will require a great level of transparency for the equity 
shareholders of the general public as required by SEC regulations. This transparency 
can come in two different ways. First, all the risks associated with the project and 
procurement documents will be offered publicly on a centrally located platform and 
will be easily accessible by the general public. Second, the general awareness about 
the project and available documentation and information will increase resulting in a 
better public outreach for the project because crowdfunding websites heavily rely on 
social media, which has become the most effective vehicle for dissemination of 
information, to reach to the maximum possible users..  
Weaknesses 
 
– Induced complexity 
Adding a new layer of investors to the project increases the number of equity 
stakeholders and could potentially require extra efforts to manage communication and 
relationships with this new layer of equity stakeholders. In addition, equity shares 




of financing between lenders and senior equity holders. This new layer of financing 
would be defined in financing documents, the risks and responsibilities of these new 
investors would be defined in contract documents, and the project team would 
establish a communication strategy to involve them throughout the process. As a 
result, new complexities will be added to contract documents, procurement efforts, 
and project implementation strategies and will need to be addressed with additional 
resources and special attention. In addition, federal and state regulations may require 
taking additional steps above and beyond what is required under current P3 model 
steps, making the process more complicated, time consuming and expensive.  
– Lack of track record and market confidence 
The idea of raising equity through crowdfunding might be a challenging idea to 
implement particularly since it has very limited track record. Similar to other new 
ideas and methods, building market confidence in equity crowdfunding, potentially 
through pilot projects at smaller scale, is necessary before this idea can be implicated 
in large scale P3 projects. 
– Administrative and accounting challenges 
Offering equity through crowdfunding might create accounting and administrative 
challenges. The SEC regulations require issuance of certain documents such as 
audited financial statements which may impose additional expenses to the project. 
This level of effort will be minimal in large P3 projects because some of this effort 




infrastructure P3 projects, the amount of equity that may be raised through 
crowdfunding will not be significant compared to the total equity, which will make 
the overall percentage of administrative and accounting expenses lower compared to 
the size of equity investment. This challenge, however, could be a significant cost 
challenge for smaller P3 projects. In addition, the administrative expenses to create 
and run the platform might be high, particularly in early days of implementation of 
this new approach when only a few projects will be financed using this method. As a 
result, the transaction cost of offering equity shares on the platform could be high 
making it less attractive. This issue might be resolved if the number of transactions 
and the amount of equity shares offered on the platform increase to create economy of 
scale and reduce transaction fee that platform charges. 
– Third-party confidential information  
As discussed earlier, selling equity shares through crowdfunding requires public 
disclosure of more information than is normally disclosed for P3 projects. In 
particular, this disclosure includes information related to the performance of project, 
the SPV’s balance sheet and potentially financial information regarding the parent 
companies. The SPV normally deems some of this information as proprietary 
information and thus conflicts may exist in disclosing it. Also, many of the parent 
companies are publicly traded in the stock market and have their own information 
sharing policies, which may preclude release of their business information.  
 




Although crowdfunding provides a great investment and engagement opportunity in 
P3 projects to individual investors and communities, the crowdfunding tool heavily 
relies on internet and social media as a marketing tool and information exchange. 
Unfortunately, many communities particularly in rural areas may not have easy 
access to social media and online platforms. As a result, a social class will still not be 
included in the enhanced opportunity in P3 projects by investing as equity 
shareholders. In addition, SEC regulations would still prevent involvement of certain 
lower income classes in the equity crowdfunding investments. Although this may be 
justified by the fact that SEC regulations intends to protect economically vulnerable 
classes from risky investments, it still raises some concerns as it relates to social 




As discussed earlier, there is a huge need for investment in infrastructure projects in 
the United States; however, the available resources are limited. As a result, projects 
would be prioritized based on the benefits and costs, purpose and need, and public 
desire. Providing the opportunity to invest in P3 projects as equity holders to general 
public can capture their views on needed projects and economic value of those 
projects. For instance, if a project is offered for crowdfunding and it does not receive 
a good feedback from general public, it can be assumed that that project does not 
have a high priority for citizens. On the other hand, high interest in investment of 




should receive special attention from decision makers. The platforms can provide this 
information by running dry-tests on equity offering. , in which potential local 
investors may be able to register their names in advance during project development 
or early procurement phase and reserve their right to purchase equity shares, when the 
shares are ready to be publicly offered, for a small contingency payment. 
– Idea exchange 
Crowdfunding technology brings together community members from different ages 
and genders, local officials, elected officials, special groups and private companies 
under one roof in a platform. The information on the platform for a particular project 
or all other projects in the region and other parts of the country will be readily 
accessible to all of these stakeholders. As a result of this great database, new ideas 
can be formulated and exchanged easily and lessons learned can be shared. The 
platform may also provide the opportunity for community members to share their 
ideas about critical projects in their community with the decision makers and other 
investors, and potentially define new projects that can be added to the pipeline and 
procured as a P3 projects. For instance, people of a community can introduce the idea 
of building a new access road or bridge to provide a better access for people in that 
community. This community might be interested to utilize value capture techniques 
and invest in the project, even at a low rate of return, knowing that the new access 
road will enhance their community and will increase the price of their property. The 
new access road may also provide a better circulation of traffic in the community 




road can result in an increase in the value of the properties which may lead to an 
increase in property taxes. Therefore, the local officials may decide to allocate a 
portion of this increase in tax revenue to the project over the next few years to make 
availability payments to a concessionaire who is willing to develop and maintain the 
road. Therefore, because of this strength of the proposed equity crowdfunding 
approach in P3s, a simple idea may create a win-win situation for everyone and can 
be delivered using equity crowdfunding in a P3 delivery method. 
Threats 
 
– Business failure  
Institutional investors usually have the experience to analyze risk and rewards and 
make educated investment decisions. They usually have a portfolio of investments 
and closely monitor the investment risk of their profile and manage it appropriately. 
This level of sophistication usually does not exist at crowdfunding level for individual 
investors. As a result, they may make investment choices without fully understanding 
the risks associated with their investment. Although SEC rules try to prequalify 
investors based on their resources and put a cap on the level of investment that they 
can make based on their financial status, these rules cannot fully protect individual 
investors from making wrong choices. Since in a crowdfunding approach many 
individuals will invest in one project, the failure of that project may result in 
significant consequences for many people. Such project may become too big to fail 
creating a political risk for the government. Therefore, it is important to impose 




flexibility to responsible investors, but not at a level that opens the door for 
irresponsible investors who may create a risk bubble.  
 
– Fraud 
Since equity crowdfunding in general is a new approach, and P3 projects are still 
evolving in the U.S., the proposed equity crowdfunding approach is still immature 
and has a weakness toward fraud. As market expands for equity crowdfunding for 
P3s, there inevitably would be attempts to regulate and defraud the market 
particularly since most of P3s are off balance sheet financing with limited or no ties 
to the parent company. As a result, some fraudulent activities may happen both at 
project level and at the equity crowdfunding market. The risk of these activities can 
be mitigated by development of business rules, use of technology and providing 
education to stakeholders particularly investors. 
– Possible misconceptions  
The proposed model requires a novel approach which is relatively new and 
unexplored. The lack of understanding and experience on this approach may create 
misconceptions that can create problems for political and public buy-in for the 
proposed model. For instance, one of the justifications that proponents of P3 models 
use is the transfer of risks to private sector. Introducing a new P3 model in which 
general public is taking the risks at equity level may create the misconception that 




proper education can explain that under the enhanced P3 model the general public 










This chapter takes the advantage of the new flexibility that has been created under 
JOBS Act to introduce a crowdfunding enhanced P3 model. In order to better 
understand advantages and disadvantages of this enhanced P3 model, a SWOT 
analysis has been conducted to provide insight into some questions of significant 
importance. This analysis addresses some of the challenges associated with the 
current P3 model, such as high rate of return on equity investment for a few 
infrastructure funds and lack of transparency. Under the current P3 model a 
partnership is formed between a private partner and a public agency, however, the 
Return on equity Induced complexity
Equal investment opportunity Lack of track record and market confidence
Enhanced stakeholder support Administrative and accounting challenges
























level of engagement from general public and communities is very limited. This study 
introduces a new framework for the P3 model in which general public and 
communities will have the opportunities to be involved as a partner in P3 projects.  
The strengths of the new model come from involvement of the general public, 
especially local communities, as a major partner in the model. This engagement 
provides the opportunity to use the wisdom and power of the crowd to change the 
semi-monopolist environment under the current P3 model and create opportunities for 
idea exchange, additional transparency and enhanced public engagement in 
prioritization decision makings. The risky nature of business failure in infrastructure 
investment and fraud cannot be fully changed; however, as the enhanced model 
matures, more data on different projects and transactions becomes available for 
comparison purposes and investors gain more experience. Consequently, the overall 
risk of business failure under the enhanced P3 model will be reduced. The widespread 
use of this model will also draw additional attention from regulatory agencies to 
protect investors from fraud.  A need for additional steps to be taken to ensure enough 
due diligence has been done on the legitimacy of equity shares that are offered under 
this model to prevent fraud will still exist.   
The roots of weaknesses of the enhanced P3 model are in the additional complexity 
that will be added to the already complex P3 model. Although this additional 
complexity may negatively impact favorable opportunities, it can be managed and 
controlled by developing standardized contractual documents, provisions, 




Since crowdfunding has been successfully used in other sectors, the chance that it can 
be successfully used in P3 projects is probable. The large size of P3 projects, 
however, may create additional sensitivity around these projects making threats more 
politically sensitive. This challenge can be overcome by educating decision makers 
and general public on benefits and shortcomings of crowdfunding to ensure this tool 
is used at the right place, at the right time and by the right people.  
In sum, the advantages of the enhanced P3 model outweigh the disadvantages. Many 
issues, however, still exist that makes implementation of this model challenging. 
Additional research is needed to further study the details of implications of the 
enhanced P3 model in practice. In particular, the optimal term for equity shares, 
differences in the risk and reward profiles between equity shareholders and 
infrastructure funds, and a standardized process that may be used to price and offer 
equity shares. A need to gauge the political appetite to champion for introduction of a 
new P3 model while there is a lot of sensitivity around privatization of public goods 
exists. The authors also recognize the need to investigate the performance of the new 
P3 model from a financial perspective, particularly quantification of any potential 
savings as a result of potential reduction in rate of returns or any credit enhancement 





Chapter 7:  Conclusion  
 
Through a review of infrastructure P3 financing models in the U.S., and the 
exploration of relevant project characteristics and public goals and objectives, the 
central research question “how the existing cases can be used to potentially enhance 
the current P3 model both in terms of bankability and overall procurement process 
maturity?” has been explored. The research method of QCA provided a framework 
suitable for the level of information that was available as input, and enabled a 
systematic way to identify logical patterns between multiple conditions and 
outcomes. Some statistical methods were used to further refine the results and make 
conclusions that can help to better understand how financing package of P3 projects 
may change based on project characteristics and policy objectives.  
Summary of Contributions 
 
This work presents six main contributions: the first three are primarily focused toward 
academia, while the last three provide new decision-making tools to aid practitioners. 
1. Collecting and making accessible P3-related studies and publications, both 
from academic literature and industry information (financing documents, 
procurement documents, etc.) across a broad range of disciplines, including 
but not limited to construction, procurement, finance, policy, and law.  
2. Providing a comprehensive list of credit enhancements and a discussion on 





3. Reviewing multiple project characteristics and identifying the most important 
variables that may impact outcomes. 
4.  Introducing a novel approach to compare interest rate on different types of 
debt (bank loan, variable interest rate bonds, fixed interest rate bonds, tax-
exempt bonds, etc.) . To the best of author’s knowledge, this is the first time 
that such a method has been used to compare interest rate on debt in project 
finance. 
5. Developing a P3 case data base particularly as it relates to financing elements 
of 18 P3 deals that have reached financial closed in the U.S. over the last two 
decades The QCA patterns identified in this study yield interesting insights 
into effective combinations of project capital value, term, construction risk, 
traffic and revenue risk and competition at procurement stage to achieve a 
better financing package for P3 projects. 
6. . Introducing an enhanced P3 model that can enhance delivery of P3 projects 
through offering equity shares using a crowdfunding approach.  
The findings of this study can help P3 practitioners to better utilize available tools and 
also provides them with new tools to further enhance procurement of P3 projects.  
The case library provides a significant resource to practitioners as well as researchers 
and the proposed corwdfunding approach is a novel step toward taking P3 projects to 






 Limitations of Study 
 
This contains several limitations both in its approach and in its application. The QCA 
research methodology in general has limitations due to having a small/medium 
sample size, making it less powerful than statistical analysis. The method also uses 
simplifying  assumptions to generalize patterns and draw conclusions which makes it 
even less powerful, however, although as explained earlier this method is the most 
powerful method that could practically perform the required analysis for the purpose 
of this study.  
Further, given the complexity of the financing packages for P3 projects, and the fact 
that some information is not publicly available either due to proprietary nature of the 
information or policy considerations, some of the collected information cannot be 
verified using publicly available sources. The study has relied on information from 
reliable sources who have worked on the projects. 
Policy Implications 
Since P3 industry is still relatively new in the U.S., and it evolving both in terms of 
practice and policy, the results of this study can help policy makers to better 
understand benefits and shortcomes of different P3 structures, particularly, the 
discussion on suitability of different P3 models for projects with different 
characteristics and policy objectives. Unlike the direction in most literature to choose 
one over another, this study has taken an unbiased view on different P3 models such 
as availability payments and toll concessions to better analyze how, and under what 




an unbiased view of how different tools in the toolbox can be used to deliver policy 
objectives.  
The other major policy implication of this study is reaffirmation of the fact that 
enhanced transparency and better competition, at different levels of the deal, will 
provide better value for the public. In particular, this dissertation has focused on the 
competition at procurement stage, and competition at equity investment level to 
identify opportunities that exist and the values that can be gained through enhanced 
completion.  
 
Directions for Future Work 
This study is a step toward better understanding policy and financial implications of 
different P3 structures. It has collected one of the first comprehensive datases on 
transportation P3 projects in the U.S., and has tried to take the discussions from 
whether P3s are useful or not, to a new level that how P3s can be optimized.  
This area is still relatively new, and under evolution. There is a research need to 
further analyze data collected in the database to further refine the results  by (a) 
introducing new conditions into the QCA analysis to consider other aspects of P3 
projects and (b) further analyzing the application of the proposed enhanced P3 model 






























I-4 Ultimate (Florida) 
Description Urban Greenfield Managed Lanes 
Financial Close Sep-14 
Capital Value 2.3 billion 
Term 40 years 
Construction Risk High 
Traffic Risk None (Availability Payments) 








Term 4 to 9 years 
# of Banks six 
Bonds/PAB 
Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
TIFIA 
Amount $949.00 
Pricing  3.16% 
Term $130.7 due 2023 and $818.4 in 2052 
Equity Amount $104.00 IRR 12% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR Swap Rates 1.77% 
Revenue Bond Index 4.87% 
30-Year Treasury  3.37%  
Procurement Summary 







AP Best Value Selection 
Mar-2014 Sep-2014 4 






Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt leverage 




I-69 Section 5 
Description Greenfield 
Financial Close Jul-14 
Capital Value $290.00million 
Term 37 years 
Construction Risk Moderate 







Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
# of Banks   
Bonds/PAB 
Amount $251.76 
Pricing 1.50% to 5.00% 
Term 2017-2046 
TIFIA 
Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
Equity Amount $40.45 IRR 9.93% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR Swap Rates 1.8% 
Revenue Bond Index 4.98% 
30-Year Treasury  3.33%  
Procurement Summary 







AP Best Value Selection 
Jan-2014 Jul-2014 4 
Four teams short-listed out of five: 
Macquarie/Lane, PSP/Isolux, Pleanary 
and Walsh/Meridiam.  
 
 
 QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt leverage 





Description Greenfield Managed Lanes 
Financial Close Feb-14 
Capital Value US$140.00m 
Term 50 years 
Construction Risk Moderate 
Traffic Risk Significant, real toll, managed lane 






Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
# of Banks   
Bonds/PAB 
Amount $40.91 
Pricing $20.36M PABs at 5.875% and $20.554 Subordinated Loan at 11%  










Bond Index 5.29% 
30-Year 
Treasury  3.66%  
Procurement Summary 







Tolls Best Value Selection 
Mar-2013 Feb-2014 2 
Three teams short-listed out of four: 
Cintra, Plenary, Isolux Corsan.  Only 
two submitted binding proposals: 
Plenary and Isolux Corsan. 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




Goethals Bridge (NY/NJ) 
Description Urban Greenfield 
Financial Close Nov-13 
Capital Value $1.30bn 
Term 40 years 
Construction Risk High 
Traffic Risk None (Availability Payments) 






Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
# of Banks   
Bonds/PAB 
Amount $460.92 




Pricing   
Term 2051 
Equity Amount $106.82 IRR 13.80% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR 
Swap Rates 1.47% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 5.23% 
30-Year 
Treasury  3.8%  
Procurement Summary 
 







AP Lowest Cost Jan-2013 Nov-2013 3 Three teams short-listed: Kiewit/Macquarie, Skanska and ACS. 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




NTE Segments 3A & 3B 
Description Urban Greenfield Managed Lanes 
Financial Close Sep-13 
Capital Value $1.65billion 
Term 52 years 
Construction Risk Moderate 
Traffic Risk Significant Real Toll, Managed Lane 






Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
# of Banks   
Bonds/PAB 
Amount $274.03 






Equity Amount $430.29 IRR 13% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR 
Swap Rates 1.76% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 5.27% 
30-Year 
Treasury  3.79%  
Procurement Summary 
 













Jul-2011 Sep-2013 1 
2009 agreement with 
Cintra/Meridiam authorized 
negotiation of the terms for 
construction of additional segments 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




East End Crossings – East End Crossing (OH) 
Description Urban Greenfield 
Financial Close Mar-13 
Capital Value US$763.00m 
Term 35 years 
Construction Risk Moderate 
Traffic Risk None (Availability Payments) 






Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
# of Banks   
Bonds/PAB 
Amount $676.80 
Pricing 4.56% to 5.01% 
Term 2019-2051 
TIFIA 
Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
Equity Amount $78.10 IRR 12% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR 
Swap Rates 0.98% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 4.36% 
30-Year 
Treasury  3.16%  
Procurement Summary 







AP Best Value Selection 
Nov-2012 Mar-2013 3 
Three teams short-listed out of five: 





Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




I-95 Express Lanes (VA) 
Description Urban Greenfield 
Financial Close Jul-12 
Capital Value US$940.00m 
Term 76 years 
Construction Risk Moderate 
Traffic Risk Significant Real Toll, Managed Lane 






Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
# of Banks   
Bonds/PAB 
Amount $252.60 











Bond Index 4.54% 
30-Year 
Treasury  2.59%  
Procurement Summary 
 







Tolls Best Value Selection 
Nov-2005 Jul-2012 2 
Unsolicited proposal submitted by 
Clark/Shirley in September 2003 
started PPTA process.  
Fluor/Transurban detailed proposal 
selected in November 2005. 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




Presidio Parkway (CA) 
Description Urban Greenfield 
Financial Close Jun-12 
Capital Value US$473.00m 
Term 30 years 
Construction Risk Moderate  
Traffic Risk None (Availability Payments) 







Pricing 2.535% (LIBOR + 175 bp) 
Term 3.5 years 
# of Banks six 
Bonds/PAB 
Amount   
Pricing   




0.46% for $90M 3.5 year tranche; 2.71% for $63M 28-year 
tranche 
Term 3.5 and 28 years 
Equity Amount $45.60 IRR 14.46% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR 
Swap Rates 0.99% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 4.74% 
30-Year 
Treasury  2.7%  
Procurement Summary 







AP Best Value Selection 
Oct-2010 Jun-2012 2 
Three teams short-listed and two 
submitted bids: 
HOCHTIEF/Meridiam and ACS. 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




Midtown Tunnel (VA) 
Description Greenfield / Brownfield 
Financial Close Apr-12 
Capital Value US$2.10bn 
Term 58 years 
Construction Risk High 
Traffic Risk Real Toll, well understood 






Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
# of Banks   
Bonds/PAB 
Amount $663.75 






Equity Amount $272.00 IRR 12% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR 
Swap Rates 1.17% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 4.83% 
30-Year 











Tolls Best Value Selection 
Sep-2008 Apr-2012 1 
VDOT issued Solicition for Proposals 
after receiving an unsolicited 
proposal from Skanska 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




I-635 LBJ Freeway (TX) 
Description Urban Brownfield 
Managed Lanes 
Financial Close Jun-10 
Capital Value US$2.6 blillion 
Term 52 Years 
Construction Risk Moderate 
Traffic Risk Significant Real Toll, Managed Lane 






Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
# of Banks   
Bonds/PAB 
Amount $615.00 






Equity Amount $665.00 IRR 12.76% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR 
Swap Rates 2.29% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 4.84% 
30-Year 
Treasury  4.13%  
Procurement Summary 
 







Tolls Best Value Selection 
Jan-2009 Jun-2010 2 





Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




North Tarrant Express (TX) 
Description Urban Greenfield 
Managed Lanes 
Financial Close Dec-09 
Capital Value US$2.0 billion 
Term 52 Years 
Construction Risk Moderate 
Traffic Risk Significant Real Toll, Managed Lane 






Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
# of Banks   
Bonds/PAB 
Amount $400.00 
Pricing $59.8 in 2031 at 7.50% and $340.2 in 2039 at 6.875% 





Equity Amount $427.00 IRR 13.12% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR 
Swap Rates 2.69% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 4.94% 
30-Year 
Treasury  4.49%  
Procurement Summary 







Tolls Best Value Selection 
Dec-2008 Dec-2009 2 
Four teams short-listed out of seven 
proposals:  Balfour Beatty/BRISA, 
Cintra/Meridiam, Itinere, OHL.  Only 
two submitted proposals: Cintra and 
OHL 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




Port of Miami Tunnel (VA) 
Description Urban Greenfield 
Financial Close Oct-09 
Capital Value US$1.1 billion 
Term 35 Years 
Construction Risk High 
Traffic Risk None (Availability Payments) 







Pricing LIBOR + 300 bp swapped to 6.63% 
Term 5 to 7 years 
# of Banks ten 
Bonds/PAB 
Amount   
Pricing   





Equity Amount $80.30 IRR 11.33% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR 
Swap Rates 2.68% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 4.81% 
30-Year 
Treasury  4.19%  
Procurement Summary 







AP Best Value Selection 
Mar-2007 Oct-2009 3 
3 teams shortlisted:  Babcock & 
Brown, ACS/Odebrecht/Parsons, and 
FCC/Morgan Stanley.   Meridian 
allowed to replace Babcock and 
Brown equity in May 2009. 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 






Financial Close Mar-09 
Capital Value US$1.83 billion 
Term 35 Years 
Construction Risk Moderate 
Traffic Risk None (Availability Payments) 






Pricing LIBOR + 300 to 400 bp 
Term 10 years 
# of Banks twelve 
Bonds/PAB 
Amount   
Pricing   
















Treasury  3.64%  
Procurement Summary 
 







AP Best Value Selection 
Sep-2008 Mar-2009 2 
Four short-listed but only two teams 
submitted bids:  ACS Dragados-
Macquarie and Babcock and Brown 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




SH-130 Segments 5&6 (TX) 
Description Greenfield 
Financial Close Mar-08 
Capital Value US$1.3 billion 
Term Unavailable 
Construction Risk Moderate 
Traffic Risk Real Toll 






Pricing LIBOR + 130 to 170 bp 
Term 30 years 
# of Banks ten 
Bonds/PAB 
Amount   
Pricing   










Bond Index 5.17% 
30-Year 
Treasury  4.39%  
Procurement Summary 













Aug-2004 Mar-2008 1 
Cintra bid $7.2 billion for right to 
negotiate six projects under Trans 
Texas Corridor 35.   Other bidders 
for TTC-35 were teams led by Fluor 
and Skanska   
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




I-495 Capital Beltway HOT Lanes (VA) 
Description Greenfield HOT Lanes 
Financial Close Dec-07 
Capital Value US$2.1 billion 
Term 80 Years 
Construction Risk Moderate 
Traffic Risk Significant Real Toll, Managed Lane 






Amount   
Pricing   
Term   




20-year SIFMA municipal index swap with 3.6% fixed rate (LOC from 
DEPFA + three banks) 





Equity Amount $350.00 IRR 13.00% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR 
Swap Rates 4.31% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 4.77% 
30-Year 
Treasury  4.53%  
Procurement Summary 












Jun-2002 Dec-2007 1 Transurban and Fluor 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




Pocahontas Parkway (VA) 
 
Description Urban Brownfield 
Financial Close Jun-06 
Capital Value US$600 million (long-term lease) 
Term 99 Years 
Construction Risk None 








Pricing LIBOR + 85 to 130 bp 
Term 30 years 
# of Banks three 
Bonds/PAB 
Amount $21.90 
Pricing Affiliated Subordinate Note (at 10%) 




Term two tranches (2042,2044) 
Equity Amount $119.00 IRR 12.60% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR 
Swap Rates 5.59% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 5.24% 
30-Year 
Treasury  5.15%  
Procurement Summary 
 












Oct-2004 Jun-2006 1 Transurban / DEPFA 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




Indiana Toll Road (IN) 
Description Urban Brownfield 
Financial Close Jun-06 
Capital Value $3.8 billion (long-term lease) 
Term 75 Years 
Construction Risk None 
Traffic Risk Mature, Real Toll, Long Op. History   







Pricing Six month LIBOR + 95 to 125 bp plus swap fees 
Term 20 years 
# of Banks seven 
Bonds/PAB 
Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
TIFIA 
Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
Equity Amount $770.00 IRR 13.00% 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR 
Swap Rates 5.59% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 5.24% 
30-Year 
Treasury  5.15%  
Procurement Summary 
 











Jan-2006 Jun-2006 4 
Cintra/Macquarie - $3.8 billion, 
Babcock & Brown - $2.84 billion, 
Itinere -$2.52 billion, Morgan 
Stanley - $1.9 billion 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 




Chicago Skyway (IL) 
Description Urban Brownfield 
Financial Close Jan-05 
Capital Value US $1.83 billion (long-term lease) 
Term 99 Years 
Construction Risk None 
Traffic Risk Mature, Real Toll, Long Op. History 







Pricing Six month LIBOR + 250 bp 
Term 30 year sub debt 
# of Banks three 
Bonds/PAB 
Amount $1,400.00 
Pricing $961 CABs (LIBOR +38) and $439 Current (LIBOR +28) 
Term CABS - 21 years, Current 12 years 
TIFIA 
Amount   
Pricing   
Term   
Equity Amount $229.00 IRR 12.30% (post refi) 
Benchmark Rates 
LIBOR 
Swap Rates 4.09% 
Revenue 
Bond Index 4.92% 
30-Year 
Treasury   
Procurement Summary 
 











Oct-2004 Jan-2005 3 
Cintra/Macquarie - $1.83 billion, 
Vinci - $700.5 million, Abertis -$505 
million 
QCA INDEX 
Capital Value Term Construction Risk Traffic Risk Competition  Equity Debt Leverage 
































Note: The 30-year treasury rate did not exist in January 2005. The number used is this 














Chicago Skyway Jan-2005 2.89% 4.09% 4.92% 3.70% 4.75% 2.03%
Indiana Toll Road Jun-2006 5.49% 5.59% 5.24% 4.09% 5.15% -0.25%
Pocahontas Parkway Jun-2006 5.49% 5.59% 5.24% 4.09% 5.15% -0.25%
I-495 HOT Dec-2007 4.83% 4.31% 4.77% 3.53% 4.53% -0.06%
SH 130 Seg. 5&6 Mar-2008 2.68% 3.39% 5.17% 2.39% 4.39% 2.49%
I-595 (FL) Mar-2009 1.83% 2.46% 5.81% 1.90% 2.95% 3.64% 3.98%
Port of Miami Tunnel Oct-2009 0.59% 2.68% 4.81% 2.41% 3.49% 4.19% 4.22%
North Tarrant Express 
(NTE)
Dec-2009 0.45% 2.69% 4.94% 2.35% 4.49% 4.49%
I-635 (LBJ Freeway) Jun-2010 0.75% 2.29% 4.84% 2.09% 4.13% 4.09%
Midtown Tunnel (VA) Apr-2012 0.73% 1.17% 4.83% 0.86% 3.18% 4.10%
Presidio Parkway (CA) Jun-2012 0.74% 0.99% 4.74% 0.71% 2.7% 4.00%
I-95 HOT Lanes (VA) Jul-2012 0.73% 0.85% 4.54% 0.59% 2.59% 3.81%
Ohio River Bridges - 
East End
Mar-2013 0.45% 0.98% 4.36% 0.88% 3.16% 3.91%
NTE Segments 3A & 3B Sep-2013 0.38% 1.76% 5.27% 1.71% 3.79% 4.89%
Goethals Bridge Nov-2013 0.35% 1.47% 5.23% 1.37% 3.8% 4.88%
US-36 Feb-2014 0.33% 1.62% 5.29% 1.53% 3.66% 4.96%
I-69 Section 5 Jul-2014 0.33% 1.80% 4.98% 1.68% 3.33% 4.65%
I-4 Managed Lanes Sep-2014 0.33% 1.77% 4.87% 1.79% 3.37% 4.54%
Benchmark Rates Spread between 






Note: The estimated fixed rate for I-635 (LBJ Freeway) is yield to maturity for the 





Chicago Skyway Taxable LIBOR + 250 bp 6.590% -0.99% 5.60% 0.68%
Indiana Toll Road Taxable LIBOR + 125 bp 6.840% -1.03% 5.81% 0.57%
Pocahontas 
Parkway




swap + 175 bp
5.350% - - 5.35% 0.58%
SH 130 Seg. 5&6 Taxable LIBOR + 170 bp 5.090% - -0.76% 4.33% -0.84%
I-595 (FL) Taxable LIBOR + 400 bp 6.460% 0.69% -1.07% 6.08% 0.27%
Port of Miami 
Tunnel




PABs maturing in 
2039
6.875% -                        - 6.88% 1.94%
I-635 (LBJ Freeway) Tax-Exempt
PABs maturing in 
2040




PABs maturing in 
2042
5.500% -                        - 5.50% 0.67%
Presidio Parkway 
(CA)
Taxable LIBOR + 175 bp 2.740% 1.99% -0.71% 4.02% -0.72%
I-95 HOT Lanes (VA) Tax-Exempt
PABs maturing in 
2040
4.450% -                        - 4.45% -0.09%
Ohio River Bridges - 
East End
Tax-Exempt
PABs maturing in 
2051
5.010% -                        - 5.01% 0.65%
NTE Segments 3A & 
3B
Tax-Exempt
PABs maturing in 
2043
6.750% -                        - 6.75% 1.48%
Goethals Bridge Tax-Exempt
PABs maturing in 
2052
5.625% -                        - 5.63% 0.40%
US-36 Tax-Exempt
PABs maturing in 
2050
5.875% -                        - 5.88% 0.58%
I-69 Section 5 Tax-Exempt
PABs maturing in 
2046
5.000% -                        - 5.00% 0.02%
I-4 Managed Lanes Taxable Bank Debt 3.850% 1.58% -0.81% 4.62% -0.25%





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Transaction Primary Sources 






Consolidated Financial Statements - Statewide Mobility Partners 












Capital Beltway Capital Beltway Funding Corporation of Virginia Senior Lien 
Toll Revenue Bonds (I-495 Hot Lanes Project) Series 2008 A 
through D (Tax-Exempt AMT 
http://emma.msrb.org/MS65630-MS269419-MD533919.pdf 
 
“Capital Beltway bonds placed” –Infrastructure Journal and 
Project Finance Magazine, June 13, 2008 
 
SH 130 Seg. 5&6  




I-595 (FL)  
“ACS Finances Florida I-595 Availability-Pay Project” - Public 











Port of Miami 
Tunnel 











Texas Private Activity Bond Surface Transportation Corporation 
Senior Lien Revenue Bonds (NTE Mobility Partners LLC North 
Tarrant Express Managed Lanes Project), 





Texas Private Activity Bond Surface Transportation Corporation 
Senior Lien Revenue Bonds (LBJ Infrastructure Group LLC IH-






Virginia Small Business Financing Authority Senior Lien 












I-95 HOT Lanes 
(VA) 
Virginia Small Business Financing Authority Senior Lien 




Crossings - East 
End 
Indiana Finance Authority Tax-Exempt Private Activity Bonds 




3A & 3B 
Texas Private Activity Bond Surface Transportation Corporation 
Senior Lien Revenue Bonds (NTE Mobility Partners Segments 3 




Goethals Bridge New Jersey Economic Development Authority Tax-Exempt 
Private Activity Bonds (The Goethals Bridge Replacement 






US-36 Colorado High Performance Transportation Enterprise, U.S. 36 
and I-25 Managed Lanes, Senior Revenue Bonds, Series 2014 
http://emma.msrb.org/ER754243-ER586408-ER988403.pdf 
 
I-69 Section 5 Indiana Finance Authority Tax-Exempt Private Activity Bonds (I-
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